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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the
Utah Code Annotated. (Utah Supreme Court previously had jurisdiction pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code Annotated.)
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant/Plaintiffs Smiths list three issues in their "Statement of Issues." Only the
first issue listed by Smiths related to summary judgment in favor of Hales & Warner.
Smiths remaining two issues relate to summary judgment in favor of CPB.
Hales & Warner addresses and disputes Smiths first issue in, among other points,
Hales & Warner's points 1 (including its subpoints), 2, 3, 4, and 5 below. Further, Hales &
Warner addresses and disputes Smiths second listed issue in, among other points, Hales &
Warner's point 1 and its subpoints, including subpoint 1(A), 1(B), l(B)(i) and 1(C) below.
Hales & Warner addresses and disputes Smiths third listed issue in, among other points,
Hales & Warner's point 6 below.
1. Hales & Warner's first point (or issue) is that Smiths can not meet their burden
of establishing the "retained control" exception to the general rule of non-liability, (i.e. that
Hales & Warner owed a duty to Jason Smith based upon Hale & Warner's exertion of
affirmative control over the injury causing aspect of Jason Smith's work); part of this
point/issue is that the CPB/Hales & Warner contract does not create a duty (as alleged by
Smiths). (Hales & Warner also points out relating thereto that even under Smiths'
erroneously asserted "retained control" standard, no duty is created). This was addressed
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at the trial court level. (See e ^ R. 922-1020, R. 1059.)
2. Hales & Warner's second point (or issue) is that this Court should affirm the
trial court based upon Smiths' stipulation that if the standard in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT
22? (which case is attached hereto as "Attachment"9M), requires that Hales & Warner exerts
affirmative control over the "injury causing aspect of the work," then Smiths "lose." Smiths
made this stipulation to the trial court, and the trial court included this stipulation in the
Summary Judgment Order. (R. 1059, p. 45,11. 12-25, p. 46,11. 1-6, R. 1036-1043.)
3. Hales & Warner's third point (or issue) is that Smiths agreed to the trial court in
the first hearing on the subject motions that the "retained control" required that Hales &
Warner' exert of affirmative control over "the injury causing aspect" of Jason Smith's
work. When that stipulation is combined with Smiths' Stipulation referred to in point 2
above, Smiths have apparently stipulated "away" their case. This first agreement
(stipulation) was also made to the trial court during oral argument. (R. 1058, p. 30, 37.)
4. Hales & Warner's fourth point (or issue) is that Smiths' can not meet their
burden of establishing Hale & Warner "breached" a duty. This issue was briefed and argued
to the trial court below. (See R. 991-992, and R. 1059, pp. 24-25, 72-74.)
5. Hales & Warner's fifth point (or issue) is that Smiths' can not meet their burden
of establishing Hale & Warner "causation." This issue was also briefed and argued to the
trial court below. (See R. 990-991, R. 1059, pp. 25-29, 72-74.)
6. Hales & Warner's sixth point (or issue) is that Hales & Warner was an
independent contractor, and was not the employee of CPB.
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7. Hales & Warner's seventh point briefly discusses certain problems as to the
"Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief of Appellee CPB."
As to the standard of review, summary judgment is proper only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, % 12. An appellate court reviews the district court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the district court's
legal conclusions. IdL
As to stipulations, they are conclusive and binding on the party making the
stipulation, (unless good cause is shown for relief); and stipulations made by an attorney
may not be disregarded or set aside at will See e ^ DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893
P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App 1995).
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case is a civil action, (based upon claimed "negligence"), which action
Plaintiffs/Appellants Smiths brought against Defendants/Appellees Hales & Warner and the
CPB. (R. 3-12.)
B.

Course of Proceedings and its Disposition in the Trial Court

Hales & Warner and the CPB each filed motions for summary judgment, which motions
were granted. The trial court's "Summary Judgment Order" is attached hereto as Attachment
" 1 . " (See Summary Judgment Order, Attachment " 1 , " pp. 3-7, R. 1036-1043.) Hales &
Warner requests that this Court review at this juncture the trial court's "Summary Judgement

3

Order," not only because it is the Order appealed from, but because a review of the facts and
law referred to therein provides background and context for the facts discussed below.
C.

Statement of Undisputed Facts

The following are undisputed facts.
Michael Lewis Deposition
1.

Michael Lewis testified in his deposition:
Q Who did you work for in August of 1999?
A Egbert Construction.

(Michael Lewis Deposition, p. 4,11. 23-24, Attachment "2," R. 985.)
2.

As it relates to Hales & Warner Job Superintendent Maurice Egbert, (who has

no relation to Ken Egbert Construction), and as to other matters, Michael Lewis testified
as follows:
Q (by Mr. Badaruddin) I'm just asking you, what did Maurice
[Egbert of Hales & Warner], if anything, tell you to do?
The Witness: Really, nothing. Honestly, I never talked to
Maurice more than one or two words, more than, you know, if I
needed to ask him a question or something. I never really talked
to him very much.
Q (by Mr. Badaruddin) Did he ever tell you you were doing
something wrong and to stop it?
A No. That would more be the other framers.
Q Who showed you how to raise a wall?
A Ken Egbert [of Egbert Construction].
Q Okay.
A He taught me the proper way, you know, how to stand when
you're holding the wall. You don't want to stand right up to it.
You've got to put your foot back, you know, be ready to brace it,
and bail if it goes out of the way.
Q Do you remember Jason Smith?
4

A Yes. . . .
Q And what, if anything, did he do, if you know what he did?
A He was the same as I was; he was a laborer.
Q And he worked for who?
A He worked for Ken Egbert.
Q And did you have any supervisors when you worked with Ken
Egbert?
A Oh, man. We had - there was Ken, and I guess one of the other
supervisors, his name was Mannv. And then there was this guy
named Dale. . . .
Q How, if at all, did they supervise you?
A Like I said, if I was doing something wrong, you know, if I was
cutting a board wrong, they'd come tell me.
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

. . . Sometimes I would assemble the wall.
How did you know how to assemble a wall?
I was taught how.
By?
By Manny.
Okay. Did you stand up any walls?
Oh, yeah. A lot of walls.
Who told vou how to stand up a wall?

A Ken Egbert.
(Michael Lewis Deposition p. 8,11. 12-25, p. 9,11. 1-5, 8-9,15-25, p. 10,11. 1-4, 16-25, p. 11,
11.1-2, Attachment "2," R. 979-982, brackets and underlining added.)
3.

Thereafter, when separate counsel was questioning Michael Lewis,

Michael Lewis testified that Maurice Egbert of Hales & Warner never gave instructions to
Michael Lewis or Jason Smith or Jose as to lifting the subject wall.
Deposition, p. 24,11. 10-19, Attachment "2," R. 983.")
4.
As to the accident, Michael Lewis testified:
Q Do you remember August 13 of 1999?
A Was that the day of the accident?
Q Yes.
5

(Michael Lewis

A Yes.
Q Tell me what happened on that day.
A Well, we had just finished eating lunch, and there was a wall
that had already been built, and Manny - 1 think it was Manny told me and Jason and a guy named Jose to go put it up.
Q Okay. And then what happened?
A So we went over there, and we lifted it up, and it wasn't quite
onto the bolts, so Jason and Jose were holding it, and I went to go
get a board, and I was going to, you know, try to use the leverage
and jack it up onto the bolts. And I put it under there, the wall
came down. Jose bailed out of the way, and it was like Jason, he
tried to catch it, and he kind of crouched down. I don't know if he
was trying to catch it or what, it just came down on him.
And we started yelling for help, and Maurice came out of the trailer, and the
other guys, everyone else was working on the east - yeah, the east side of the
church . . . .
(Michael Lewis Deposition, p. 12,11. 9-25, p. 13,11. 1-3, 9-13, Attachment "2," R. 976-977,
underlining added.)
5. Michael Lewis testified that he did not know why the wall started to fall. (Michael
Lewis Deposition, p. 41,11. 1-12, Attachment "2," R. 975.)
6. When the wall started to fall, Michael Smith yelled "something, get out of the way,
something along the lines of that," and Jose also yelled. (Michael Lewis Deposition, p. 41,11.
22-25, p. 42,11. 1-5, Attachment "2," R. 974-975.)
7. Michael Lewis went on to testify as to Jason Smith's actions: "If he would have just
moved to the side rather than backwards, he would have been fine." (Michael Lewis
Deposition, p. 42,11. 12-13, Attachment "2," R. 974.)
Maurice Egbert Deposition
8.

Maurice Egbert of Hales & Warner, (and, again, no relation to Egbert
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Construction), testified in his deposition as follows:
Q Where were you located when the wall fell on Mr. Smith?
A I was in the job trailer.
(Maurice Egbert Deposition, p. 102,11. 6-8, Attachment "3," R. 972.)
9.

Maurice Egbert testified:
Q Did you ever tell Jason Smith how to place that wall on the
bolts . . . ?
A No, I did not.
Q Did you ever instruct or tell any Egbert employee how to raise
that wall or place that wall on the bolts?
A No, I did not.
Q Did you ever prohibit any Egbert employee or any Reynolds
Construction employee from using the method they chose in
placing a wall onto bolts for that construction site?
A No, I did not.

(Maurice Egbert Deposition, p. 183,11. 5-12, p. 184,11. 7-11, Attachment "3," R. 970-971.)
10. Maurice testifies as follows as to whether he saw the methodology that was
used in raising the wall involved in the accident: "I did not see the methodology."
(Maurice Egbert Deposition, p. 194,11. 1-5, Attachment "3," R. 969.)
Brent Reynolds Deposition
11. During his deposition, Brent Reynolds was handed a copy of the Subcontract
Agreement entered into between Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. and BRC, Inc., and
testified that he signed that contract as President of BRC, Inc. (Brent Reynolds Deposition,
p. 49,11. 4-18, Attachment "4," R. 961.)
12.

Brent Reynolds testified:
Q And the subcontract refers to an amount of $ 156,000. This is

the subcontract between Hales & Warner and BRC; correct?
A Yes.
Q And I couldn't hear you too well over here, but did you say
that your sub-subcontract between BRC and Egbert Construction
was $72,000?
A I believe that's correct
(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 50,11. 11-17, Attachment "4," R. 960.)
13. As to Brent Reynolds Construction, Inc.'s sub-subcontract with Egbert
Construction, Brent Reynolds testified:
A I was busy and didn't finish up some other work that I had
going and couldn't get to this o n e . . . . so I got Ken Egbert to do
the work.
Q Who is Ken Egbert?
A A contractor.
Q Did you ask Mr. Egbert to help you out with all aspects of the
work described on Exhibit 32 or just the framing? What did you
ask Mr. Egbert to do?
A Just the framing on it. I told him I would still supply the
material and he could do the framing on it.
Q And what is "framing"?
A Putting the frame structure together, the boards.
Q The boards?
A The structure of it.
Q And the structure - you've got to understand I don't know as
much about the construction business as you do.
A Build the walls, put the roof on.
Q That's something I can understand. You wanted Mr. Egbert to
build the walls?
A Yes.
Q And stand them up?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And what about the men who were going to do all of
this work?
A His employees.

8

(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 7, 11. 21-24, p. 8, 11. 4-5, 18-25, p. 9 11. 1-12, 18-20,
Attachment
"4,"R. 957-959.)
14. Brent Reynolds testified that other than attending the pre-construction meeting,
which occurred prior to any framing on the project, he did not again visit the site until after the
accident, testifying:
Q Did you ever visit the Highland 4 and 20 project site?
A During the framing?
Q At any time.
A I did at the preconstruction meeting.
Q Okay.
A And one time when the roof was being done, I sent some new
guys down there, and I had to take a paycheck down to them off of
one of my projects.
Q So other than those two occasions, you never set foot on the
property?
A I went down and cleaned some material up after everything
was done.
Q Okay. So other than those three occasions, you never set foot
on the property?
A No.
(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 58,11. 4-23, Attachment "4," R. 956.)
15.

At another point in his deposition, Brent Reynolds testified:
Q Did you, yourself, inspect the site from time to time?
A No.

(Reynolds Deposition, p. 53,11. 10-12, Attachment "4," R. 955.)
16.

Brent Reynolds further testified:
Q So as I understand it, you have no personal knowledge of
Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing subcontractor or a
framing subcontractor's employees as to the method in which
they should raise a wall from the ground to an upright position; is
9

that correct?
A That's correct
Q And you have no personal knowledge whether or not Hales &
Warner every gave any instructions as to any framing
subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold a wall that has
not yet been tied into place after it's been raised; is that correct?
A Correct.
Q And ^on have no personal knowledge as to whether Hales &
Warner ever gave any framing subcontractor instructions as to
how to put a wall onto the bolts after it's been raised; is that
correct?
A That's correct.
(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 47,11. 8-24, Attachment "4," R. 952.)
Joel Warner Deposition
17. Joel Warner of Hales & Warner testified in his deposition:
Q Did you ever give any instructions to the men that were raising
that wall as to how to raise that wall?
A No, I did not.
Q Did you ever give any instructions to anyone from Brent
Reynolds Construction or Egbert Construction as to how to raise
that wall?
A No.
Q Did you ever give any instructions at any time to anyone at
Brent Reynolds Construction or Egbert Construction as to how
to raise my wall?
A No.
Q Did you ever tell anyone else from Hales & Warner, including
Maurice Egbert, to give instructions to Egbert Construction or its
employees or Brent Reynolds Construction or its employees as
to how to raise a particular wall?
A No.
(Joel Warner Deposition, p. 99, 11. 14-25, p. 100, 11. 1-6, Attachment " 5 , " R. 938A-939.)
Clifford Hales Deposition
18. Clifford Hales of Hales & Warner testified that Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.
10

entered the Subcontract with BRC, Inc., (Brent Reynolds Construction Incorporated).
(Clifford Hales Deposition p. 38,11. 2-9, Attachment "6," R. 932.)
19. Clifford Hales testified as to Egbert Construction, Inc.: "We didn't have a contract
with Egbert [Construction]." (Clifford Hales Deposition, p. 40,11. 7-8, Attachment "6," R.
930, brackets added.)
20.

Clifford Hales testified in his deposition:
Q Did you ever instruct Maurice Egbert or any other Hales &
Warner employee to take over from Brent Reynolds or Maurice
Egbert the framing of the subject wall or the placement of the
subject wall onto the bolts?
A No.
Q You weren't at the scene of the accident on the day of the accident?
A No.
Q You personally didn't ever instruct any Egbert employee to
place the subject wall on the bolts in a certain method or by way
of a certain operative detail, did you?
A No.

(Clifford Hales Deposition, p. 66,11. 21-24, 67,11. 1-9, Attachment "6," R. 922, 929.)
D.

Response to Plaintiffs/Appellants Smiths Statement of "Facts"

There are a number of problems associated with Smiths' Statement of the "Fact" section
in Plaintiffs/Appellants Smith brief, many of which problems will be discussed in a number of
sub-subsections below.
(1)

Appellants Smiths inappropriately attach to their brief many pages of
various deposition transcripts that are not a part of the "Record on
Appeal:" and this Court should grant this Appellee Hales & Warner's
Motion to strike such (and any new issue or arguments raised thereto)
and/or otherwise disregard such.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure states as to the brief of an appellant:
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"All statements of fact and references to the preceding below shall be supported by citations
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7)
(underlining added). Rule 24(e) states: "References shall be made to the pages of the original
record

" S e e Utah R. App. P. 24(e).
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: "This court need not, and will not,

consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." See Uckerman v.
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 588 P.2d 142,144 (Utah 1978). The Utah Supreme
Court has also pointed out that appellate courts will not consider matters raised for the first
time on appeal. See Coleman y. Stevens, 200 Ut. 98, ^f 9.
The Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure also require that an appellant cite to the record
where an issue is preserved in the trial court. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(a).
Appellants/Plaintiffs Smiths have attached to Smiths' Brief many deposition
pages from various depositions which are not part of the "Record" on appeal.

In

Smiths' "Statement of the Facts" section, Smiths cite to this deposition testimony which is not
part of the "Record." Hales & Warner objects to such, and requests that this Court strike such
deposition testimony and other references thereto, and

any newly alleged

issues and

arguments based thereon. Hales & Warner has filed along with this Brief a Motion to Strike
Smiths' new deposition testimony and any new issues and arguments, which motion should be
granted.
However, even if this court were to consider this new deposition testimony (other than
hearsay), summary judgment in Hales & Warner's favor is still clearly indicated, as more folly
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discussed below.
As to what is, and what is not, part of the "Record," in Hales & Warner's initial reply
memorandum, it attached 5 pages of deposition testimony (that are a part of the "Record")
from Plaintiffs Kelly Smith and Lisa Nielson depositions. (See R. 677-679, 681-682.) After
the additional depositions were taken, approximately 57 pages of deposition testimony from
various deponents,"(as outlined above in Hales & Warner's Statement of Undisputed Facts),
were submitted with Hales & Warner's "Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Hales
& Warner Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs"( and are
contained in the "Record on Appeal")

(See R. 922-1020.) CPB submitted with its

supplemental reply memorandum approximately 28 additional pages from the deposition of
Dean Schick, (in addition to the deposition pages of Dean Schick previously submitted by
Hales & Warner), as well as four pages from a deposition of Paul Evans. (See R. 891-912.)
As indicated by a review of the "Record on Appeal," Plaintiffs/Appellants Smiths did
not attach any pages of any deposition transcripts to Smiths supplemental memorandum (or any
other memorandum of Smiths) filed with the trial court as to the motions for summary
judgment. In Smiths' supplemental memorandum, Smiths do refer to certain deposition pages
attached to the reply memoranda of Hales & Warner and CPB. In addition thereto, in their
supplemental memoranda to the trial court, Smiths cited to a small number of additional pages
of depositions, but fail to attach those additional pages to Smiths supplemental memorandum
or make them part of the "Record.."
In Smiths "Brief of Appellant," Smiths attach to their brief
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for the first time

approximately 13 pages of deposition testimony to which Smiths had referred, but did not
submit, in their supplemental memorandum to the trial court.

However, far more

egregiously, Smiths didn't stop there, but Smiths have also attached to their Brief for
the first time, (in addition to the 13 pages mentioned immediately above), an additional 96
pages of deposition testimony from various (7) deponents, which pages of deposition
testimony: were not submitted to the trial court: are not part of the "Record" on
appeal: and were never even cited to by Smiths at the trial level. Thus, the total number
of additional pages of deposition testimony Smiths has attached to Smiths Brief, which
pages are not part of the "Record" on appeal, is approximately 109 pages.
In particular, according to Hales & Warner's review of the "Record" on appeal and
Smiths' Brief, Smiths have inappropriately attached to their Brief the following deposition
pages from the following depositions, which deposition pages are not a part of the
"Record" on appeal, and which deposition pages were not even cited to by Smiths in
their memoranda filed with the trial court: pages 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
25, and 54 from Michael Lewis' deposition transcript; pages 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 103, 104, and 105 from Maurice Egbert's deposition transcript; pages 6, 11,
12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23,24, 31, 32, and 48 of Brent Reynolds' deposition transcript; pages
20, 21, 30, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40,41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 78, 80, 81, 82 , 83, 84,
and 85 of Joel Warner's deposition transcript; page 29 of Clifford Hales' deposition transcript;
pages 6, 7, and 9 of Dean Schick's deposition transcript; and pages 21, 22, 24, 33, 34,35, 41,
42, 43,46,47, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 80 of Paul Evans' deposition
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transcript. (See Smiths "Brief of Appellants" and attachments thereto, including in particular
Exhibits 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 18, and 19.)
As to the other approximately 13 deposition pages Smiths have inappropriately attached
to their Brief, which deposition pages are also not a part of the "Record" on appeal, they are
the following: pages 10 and 33 of Brent Reynolds' deposition transcript; pages 32,45, and 79
of Joel Warner's deposition transcript; page 28 of Clifford Hales' deposition transcript; page
8 of Dean Schick's deposition transcript; and pages 23, 24, 36, 44,45, and 48of Paul Evans'
deposition transcript. (See Smiths "Brief of Appellants" and attachments thereto, including
in particular Exhibits 1, 4, 6, 8, and 18.)
Again, this Court should strike the above referred to deposition pages, (and any new
issues and arguments Smiths now attempt to raise in their Brief); and Hale & Warner hereby
request that such be stricken..
(2)

Appellants Smiths inappropriately refer to and rely on inadmissible
hearsay, which the trial court also found to be inadmissible hearsay; and
this court should strike or otherwise disregard such inadmissible
hearsay.

As more fully discussed below, Plaintiffs' rely on inadmissible hearsay in support of
their position as to the acts of Hales & Warner. Hales & Warner objected to such hearsay to
the trial court, requesting that it be stricken. (See e.g. R. 997-1011). For example, Hales &
Warner expressly indicated to the trial court: "Brent Reynolds hearsay deposition testimony
and statements in his letter based upon hearsay should be stricken or otherwise disregarded."
(See Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Hales & Warner Construction's Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 18, R. 1003.)
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The trial court discussed such hearsay statements during oral argument and found that
as to Brent Reynolds' deposition testimony and statements made in letters written by Brent
Reynolds concerning Hales & Warner's actions before the accident, that Brent Reynolds was
relying on hearsay statements he had heard, and that he was not testifying concerning things of
which he had actual knowledge. (See Oral Argument Hearing on Motions, R. 1059, pp. 58-59,
attached hereto as Attachment "7.") The trial court points out that "in the end" Brent Reynolds'
deposition "turned into pretty minor stuff." (R. 1059, p. 59,11. 19-20.)
Smiths "Facts" that refer to or are based upon inadmissible hearsay should be stricken
and/or otherwise disregarded, including Smiths' unnumbered paragraph (in part) three, and
Smiths' paragraphs

"a" through "g" in Plaintiffs' "Statement of the Facts." (See Brief of

Appellants, pp. 9-12.)
(3)

Appellants Smiths agreed and stipulated to the trial court that there were
no dispute of facts, and that the instances to which Smiths referred as to
Hales & Warner's acts were only two minor instances, and Smiths can not
now attempt to assert otherwise.

During the second hearing before the trial court, towards the end of Smiths' counsel's
argument, Smiths' counsel agreed to the trial court that Smiths' position as to Hales &
Warner's actions (that Smiths' claimed would allegedly establish a duty in Hales & Warner)
only related to "[1] the height of the one wall, the one inch difference, and then [2] there was
the, how they were going to build the wall that was supposed to be raked to meet the trusses."
(R. 1059, p. 58 11. 23-25, p. 59 11. 1-6.)
Based upon this agreement by Smiths' counsel with the trial court, this Court should
also strike or otherwise disregard Plaintiffs' assertions that Hales & Warner's prior acts were
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anything than these two minor instances.
The point here is that Smiths cannot agree and stipulate to the trial court in oral
argument that Hales & Warner's prior actions only involved these two minor incidents, and
then later on appeal change their (Smiths') position.
Further, this Court should note that this is a stipulation by Smiths' counsel as to the
facts, which stipulation the trial court refer to in its ruling (R. 1059, p. 75, Attachment "7"),
and also expressly referred to in its "Order on Summary Judgment." As Utah law indicates,
stipulations are conclusive and binding upon the party making the stipulation; and stipulations
made by an attorney may not be disregarded or set aside at will. See e ^ DLB Collection Trust
v. Hales. 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Court App. 1995).
(4)

Further Response to Smiths "Statement of the Facts" in Smiths5 Brief.

In addition to the above, Hales & Warner will also point out that in Smiths' Briefs'
"Statement of the Facts" section, Smiths make astoundingly many other inaccurate and
misleading assertions and/or statements that are not supported by the record and/or deposition
testimony to which Smiths cite; Smiths also cite to deposition pages that are not a part of the
record, and which this Court should strike.
Because of space constrains, and because of the many inaccuracies in Smiths' Facts,
Hales & Warner requests that this Court review the actual "Record," rather than rely on Smiths'
inaccurate and misleading assertions pertaining thereto. When the actual "Record"is review,
it does not support Smiths' position, but supports the trial court's order.
Hales & Warner will also point out that, (other than the new "facts" not previously cited
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to by Smiths), most of Smiths "facts" are essentially the same facts (many verbatim) that
Smiths set forth in Smiths' supplemental memorandum to the trial court. Hales & Warner
refers his Court to, and incorporates herein, Hales & Warner's response to Smiths' "Facts"
in Hales & Warner's "Supplemental Reply Memorandum in support of Hales and Warner
Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment " (R. 997-1011.), as well as the "Reply
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Appellee Hales & Warner's Motion For
Summary Disposition" (pp. 2-16) filed in this Court, (both of which responses are
incorporated herein).
However, before concluding this section, Hales & Warner would like to discuss a
number of examples of Smiths' inaccurate and misleading assertions in Smiths' "Statement of
the Facts." For example, Smiths' counsel misrepresents Brent Reynolds' testimony in Smiths'
paragraph "g;" Smiths assert:
g. Brent Reynolds could not recall whether there was a single
aspect of the framing process with which defendant Appellee H & W did
not interfere. See BRC Depo at 28, attached as exhibit 4, (emphasis
supplied).
(See Smiths' Brief, p. 6, holding in original Smiths' Brief.) Smiths use this false "fact"
to further argue in Smiths Brief that Hales & Warner interfered with Egbert Constructions'
work. This is a misrepresentation of what was said. It is one thing to say that a person
does not know one way or the another the extent to which someone had interfered with the
work of another; it is another thing to try to mis-characterize that testimony to try to
suggest that Hales & Warner interfered with all aspects of Egbert Constructions' work.
Mr. Reynolds' deposition testimony actually states that he only had personal knowledge
18

of one thing that occurred (after the accident); and he states "I don't know" (one way or
another) as to other instances (other than the two other hearsay instances he mentioned).
As another example, the actual deposition testimony of Reynolds shows the hearsay
nature of Brent Reynolds letter and deposition testimony, as well as the inaccuracy of
Smith's "statements" thereto; see Brent Reynolds' testimony on pages 25-30, and 44-47,
(R. 941-950), as compared to Smiths' unnumbered paragraph (in part) three, and Smiths'
paragraphs "a" through "g" in Plaintiffs' "Statement of the Facts" (See Brief of Appellants,
pp. 9-12.).

Again, Brent Reynolds' deposition testimony only refers to three separate

instances as to Hales & Warner alleged action: two of these instances occurred prior to
the accident and of which Brent Reynolds admitted he had no personal knowledge; and one
instance which occurred after the accident and of which Brent Reynolds had only partial
personal knowledge.
As yet another example, in Smiths' paragraph "q," Smiths cite to deposition
testimony which is not part of the "record" on appeal, and also which was not referred to
by Smiths in their memoranda filed with the trial court. Accordingly, Smiths' paragraph
"q" should be stricken, as well as the deposition pages cited to. Further, as to the second
sentence in this paragraph, such is inaccurate and misleading as to the deposition
testimony cited in support of such. Moreover, the deposition testimony refers to the
conduct of Egbert Construction, Inc.; and nothing in the deposition testimony cited to
imposes a duty upon Hales & Warner as to the injuries suffered by Jason Smith, even if
such was considered.
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Smiths' second sentence in paragraph "q" is without citation, without basis or
foundation, and was not briefed, let alone fully briefed in the trial court. The next sentence
in paragraph "q" is also inaccurate, and contrary to the deposition testimony cited. The last
sentence of Plaintiffs' paragraph "q" is also inaccurate and misleading.
These are just some of the many and pervasive inaccuracies contained in Smiths'
"Statement of the Facts." The following (and nearly all) paragraphs in Smiths' "Statement
of the Facts"are inaccurate and/or unreliable and/or hearsay and/or not part of the
"Record:" unnumbered paragraphs 1,2,3, and 5; and designated paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f,
g, h, i, j , k, 1, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, and t.
E.

Response to Defendant CPB's Statement of Facts

Appellee Hales & Warner has received and reviewed the Brief of
Appellee/Defendant CPB. In CPB's Brief, it contains a "Statement of the Case" which
refers to various provisions to the contract between CPB and Hales & Warner. We will
pint out that there is no contract between Hales & Warner and Egbert Construction. As
to the contract between CPB and Hales & Warner, those contract provisions are irrelevant
as to whether Hales & Warner (the general contractor) owed a duty to the employee
(Plaintiff Jason Smith) of a sub-subcontractor (Egbert Construction, Inc.) under the
circumstances of this case.
However, Hales & Warner will note that the contract between CPB and Hales &
Warner expressly contemplated the use of subcontractors to perform work thereunder.
For example, as to the CPB/Hale & Warner contract, the first section of the
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General Conditions (after the Definitions section) is entitled "Execution, Correlation and
Intent," and states that the Contract Documents are
. . . not intended to control the contractor in dividing the work among the
subcontractors or to establish the extent of the work performed by any
trade.
(See "General Conditions," p. 2, R. 267.) The General Conditions of the CPB/Hales &
Warner contract also state:
The Contractor shall enter into contracts and Subcontractors to perform
portions of the Work that the Contractor does not customarily perform with
its own employees.
(See "General Conditions," p. 2, R. 267.)

Further, as to the CPB/Hales & Warner contract

and the contemplation of the use of subcontractors, there is an entire section, Section 5,
relating to subcontractors. (See "General Conditions," pp. 5-6, R. 263-264.) In addition,
in the "General Provisions," it defines a "subcontractor," stating:
... a subcontractor is any entity supplying labor, materials or equipment for
the work under separate contract with the contractor or with any other
subcontractor.
(See "General Conditions," p. 1, R. 268.)
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I of Hales & Warner's argument section points out that Hales & Warner did
not owe Jason Smith a duty under the "retained control" exception to the general rule of
non-liability. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 expressly states that the "retained control"
exception requires that the general contractor (Hales & Warner) exert affirmative control
over the "the injury-causing aspect" of Jason Smith's work. Hales & Warner did not exert

21

affirmative control over the "injury-causing aspect" of Jason Smith's work.

Plaintiffs' stipulation that if the standard in Thompson v. Jess, requires Hales & Warner
to exert affirmative control over the "injury-causing aspect of the work," then Smiths
"lose." The Thompson \ Jess decision clearly indicates that one mi ist affirmativel} exer I:
control over the injury-causing aspect of the work for there to be duty.
In b u m 111 I laics k, Warner pouns oui lhai in the initial oral argument hearing
before the trial court, Smiths' counsel stipulated that the applicable standard required the
affirmative exertion of control over "the injury-causing" aspect of the work. (It was not
ilici

\ s - iVtiiisrl had eoniliii kd iicUitioiiiil discos »*r and -.aw lliiii \\c nuiU mil

meet that standard, that Smiths' counsel changed his position at a second hearing, and
argued that a broader standard applied.) However, when one combines the stipulation made
on the record to the trial court in the first hearing, with the stipulation referred to above
in Point II made to the trial court on the record in the second hearing, it appears that the
Smiths ha v e stipi llated ,;aw a\ """" then case.

•' -

•'-

• •

In Point IV, Hales & Warner points out that Smiths cannot meet their burden of
establishing that Hales & Warner "breached" any duty claimed to have been owed Jason
Smith.
Ti: Point V, Hales & Warner points out that Smiths cannot meet their burden of
:';•• c i c j i : ; ' ; . .ujviiu'i:, •

;; i iaieb ^ ,\ arncr:: reached a dutythat caused

Jason Smith's injury.)
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In Point VI, although Smiths only assert liability against CPB relating thereto,
Hales & Warner points out that Hales & Warner is not an employee of CPB; rather, Hales
& Warner is an independent contractor.
In Point VII, Hales & Warner points out that it has received a copy of Smiths'
"Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief of Appellee CPB," and Hales & Warner points
out a number of problems pertaining thereto, including the inappropriate raising of new
issues by Smiths in their reply brief.
In conclusion, Hales & Warner requests that the court affirm the trial court's
summary judgment order, and/or otherwise grant judgment in favor of Hales & Warner.
Hales & Warner also requests an order striking the contents of various documents and new
issues/arguments inappropriately asserted by Smiths.
V. ARGUMENT
1.

Hales & Warner Owed No Duty to Jason Smith

The discussion in this point, (and in points 2, 3, 4, and 5 below), relate to Smiths'
first "issue" presented for review.
Smiths have the burden of establishing that Hales & Warner owed Jason Smith a
"duty" of care under the circumstances of this case. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d
1360, 1363-1368 (Utah 1986). Further, Smiths' have the burden of establishing the
"retained control" exception to the general rule of non-liability of general contractors.
See e.g. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT. 22, fl 13-26.) Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden of establishing that Hales & Warner owed Plaintiff Jason Smith a duty.
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Note, as the Utah Supreme Court points out in Thompson v. Jess:
We note that the term "retained control' doctrine is somewhat of a
misnomer. Under the standards announced herein, a duty of care is imposed if
the [general contractor] asserts affirmative control over or actually participates
actively in the manner of performance of the [subcontracted work.
'Retained,'to the extent the word implies placidity or non-action, is inapt."
See l

.v ** .:
S

:

brackets added)..

T h e Standard Set Forth in Thompson v. Jess as to the "Retained Control"
Exception Requires That Hales & W a r n e r Affirmatively Took Control
O v e r the "Injury-Causing Aspect" of Jason Smith's Work.

lii Appellant/Plaintiff Smith's Brief, Smiths agree, (as they agreed in the trial court
below), that Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, sets the standard as to the "retained control"
exception {<) tin: iKiuTa! rim .n'n.Hi ii.ihiiiis, ami » !<> win ;!•• r f] *•'"*< -A •• .IHUT

;V>UN!

! , i...

Smith a duty. (See Brief of Appellants, p. 19.) However, Smiths go . : their Brief to misstate the narrow standard pertaining to the "retained control" exception outlined in Thompson.
Smiths take a position that if Hales & Warner affirmatively took control over any aspect
of the framing work, even though it was unrelated to the injury-causing aspect of Jason Smith's
w ork then I lales & \ v arne t: : • < * e ::i las' :)ii Smith a cli ity as tc • till s Jason Smith's inji ii: ;; - ,
However, contrary to Smiths' position, the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson expressly
states, (multiple times and in various ways), that the "retained control" exception requires the
exertion t.: .itYiir-...:.* . -. * -ntrol over the method or operative detail of the "injury-causing
aspect of the work." Thompson, 1999 U T 22, at Iflj 15-26.
Because Thompson is miu-i.

• : • . J . •.;.

.i\. c. fhompson w 11 1 be t e * ie v\ eci in

some detail. In Thompson, Connie Jess was the owner of four motels; and Jess purchased a

used steel pipe from AmeriKan Sanitation, which pipe "would fit vertically over an existing
pipe stud" "for use as a sign post." Id- at p . When the pipe was delivered by Dennis Jensen
and Trevor Thompson, (employees of AmeriKan Sanitation), Jess asked Jensen if he would
install the pipe. Mr. Jensen agreed to do so, even though he was not equipped to erect it in the
best manner. The Thompson Court points out:
. . . Jensen, who had hoisted similar pipes more than a hundred times
before, determined on his own the manner and method of lifting and installing
the pipe. . . .
Id. at If 4 (emphasis added). Thompson was injured during the installation of the pipe, and filed
suit against Jess. Jess moved for summary judgment, arguing that:
. . . she did not direct or otherwise control the manner or method of
installing the pipe, and therefore owed no duty of care to Thompson or Jensen
to insure they raised the pipe safely . . . .
Id. at Tf 7 (emphasis added). In Thompson, the Court went on to point out:
... Thompson argues that by requesting that he and Jensen erect the pipe
when they were not obligated to do so, and by directing them to install the pipe
over the existing pipe stub, Jess asserted control over the work and thereby
assumed a duty of care to him to him under the "retained control" doctrine . . .
Id. at f 8. (The Thompson Court found that these requests and direction did not impose a duty.)
The "Analysis" section of the Thompson decision begins by setting forth the general
rule, stating:
Utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an
act or omission of the contractor or his servants." Restatement § 409; see
Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting
applicability of said general rule and certain exceptions to it). This general rule
recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not participate
in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes no
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duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of performance
implemented. See W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 409 (5th ed.
1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the
principal employer does not control the means of accomplishing the contracted
work, the contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility
for preventing the risk, and administering and distributing it." Id
Id. i H | f 13
As the Utah Supreme Court indicates in Thompson, this rule of nonliability also
applies to situations where a general contractor hires a subcontractor. (See e.g. id- at fTf
""-•"

is, 1 hompson sets the standard to be applied as to "\ v hether a general contractor

(here Hales & Warner) owes a duty to an employee of a sub-subcontractor (here Jason
Smith).
i lis,, rhompsoii. Coin t goes on t : indicate that there

. ertain exceptions t :: the

general rule of nonliability," including the "retained control" doctrine. Id. at ^J 13. The
Court points out in Thompson that the "retained control" exception is a "narrow theory of
liability" :r^n h «>

•-

* u-.i^uk r *

-^

. - r . ^ r r . - -<

. --actor)

of an independent contractor (or subcontractor) exercises enough control "to give rise to
a hi-i/^j JLI!\ oi cu:v

LC. a. " .5.

As to the "retained control" exception, the Thompson Court went on to adopt the
standard that a principal retaining an independent contractor has no duty to the employees

states that "elaboration on the contours of the standard is needed, however." Id. at f 18
(emphasis added.).
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In setting forth the contours of this standard, the Thompson Court expressly
indicates on multiple occasions that the exertion of control must be over the injurycausing aspect of the work: and in this review below of the Thompson Court's elaboration
of this standard, we underline some of these phrases indicating that the control has to be
related to the part of the work that caused the injury.
Immediately after indicating that elaboration on the contours of the standard is
needed, the Thompson Court states:
Under the "active participation" standard, a principal employer is
subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's
work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the
manner of performance of the contracted work. S^ee Conklin v. Cohen, 287
So. 2d 56,60 (Fla. 1973) (holding that under "active participation" standard,
principal employer must directly influence manner in which work is
performed; no duty arises from "passive nonparticipation"). Such an
assertion of control occurs, for example, when the principal employer
directs that the contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or
otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished. See, e.g., Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 170 Ariz.
384, 825 P.2d 5,7-8 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing liability where subcontractor's
employee was injured as result of new, less safe method of work required
by general contractor); Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S. W.2d 415,418 (Tex.
1985) (imposing liability where subcontractor was ordered to operate
backhoe dangerously close to plaintiff).
Id. at Tf 19 (underlining added).
This Court will note that the above quoted language in Thompson includes cases
addressing whether a duty was owed by a general contractor to an injured employee of the
subcontractor. Id. The Thompson Court goes on to state:
. . . In other words, to have "actively participated" in the contracted
work, a principal employer must have exercised affirmative control over the
method or operative detail of that work. The degree of control necessary for
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the creation of a legal duty must involve either the direct management of the
means and methods of the independent contractor's activities or the
provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury."
. . . [ I]he principal employer must exert such control over the means
utilized that the contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the
work in his or her own way.

language indicating that the control has to be over the "injury-causing aspect of the work;"
and such only makes sense for vark^. . bvious reasons. Among other things, causation
(oi Hi; ;-. :.'..! • *

negligent heh-'-ior has always been a key element to negligence

claims.
, n c ifa Q m p S o n Court goes on to uiscuss a ca.sc u1 iuusiralcr Hie roquisiic ic\ ei t,»i
control over the contractor's work;" and this Court will note that this illustrative case
involves a general contractor and an injured employee of a subcontractor. The Thompson
< nun slates:
The requisite level of control over the contractor's work is well
illustrated in Lewis, 825 P.2d at 7-8. There, the general contractor, Riebe,
hired the subcontractor, Garges, to install a pitched roof constructed of
beams and sheets of plywood nailed to the beams. After Garges had already
put the plywood in place, Riebe's on-site superintendent told Garges the
roof was improperly installed and ordered it redone, specifying the use of
H-clips to secure the plywood. Pursuant to this instruction, Garges
employees began removing the nails from each row of plywood, installing
H-clips, and then renailing the plywood to the beams. Soon thereafter,
however, Riebe's superintendent instructed the Garges employees to use a
different, faster method of dislodging the plywood by banging it from
underneath. Because this method resulted in plywood being dislodged
faster than H-clips could be installed, numerous sheets of plywood were
left lying loose on top of the beams. A Garges employee stepped on the
loose plywood and feel through the roof, incurring serious injuries. See M.
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Thus, in Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the
subcontractor's method of performing the work and instructed that a
quicker but less safe method be implemented. A worker was injured as a
direct result of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's
method. The court concluded, on the basis of these facts, that the general
contractor exercised sufficient control over the means used in performing
the contracted work to subject it to retained control liability. See 825 P.2d
at 14-15.
Id. at ff 22, 23, (underlining added). Again, this Court will note the language indicating
that the injury was "a direct result" of the dangerous condition created by the control
exerted by the general contractor. Thus, the Thompson Court's discussion of the Lewis
case illustrates, and expressly states, the necessary causal link between the control exerted
by the general contractor and the injury.
It is also important to note, as indicated in the Thompson Court's discussion of
Lewis, that the Utah Supreme Court did not state that general contractor Riebe was liable
merely because he had entered into a subcontract with a subcontractor (Garges) to do the
framing work on that project. Further, in its discussion of Lewis, the Utah Supreme Court
did not state that general contractor Reibe was liable merely because general contractor
Reibe had an on-site superintendent.
Moreover, the Thompson Courts discussion of Lewis indicates that the general
contractor was not liable due to the general contractor's on-site superintendent's first
action of telling the subcontractor "Garges the roof was improperly installed and
order[ing] it redone, specifying the use of H-clips to secure the plywood." Id. at ^ 22. The
Thompson Court's discussion of Lewis indicates that the general contractor only became
liable due to the second and "thereafter" action by general contractor "Reibe's
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superintendent instuct[ing] the Garges employees to use a different" and "quicker but less

of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's method;" and it was only
those additional facts, (i.e. of the general contractor's exertion of affirmative control and

method), that subjected the general contractor to liability

Id. at Tflj 22, 23 (brackets

added).
In concluding its analysis on the "retain control" exception, the Thompson Court
applies the facts of that case to the standard enunciated, stating:
Applying these standards to the case at hand, we conclude that Jess
did not actively participate in the manner in which Thompson and Jensen
attempted to lift and install the steel pipe. After agreeing to erect the pipe,
Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for bringing about the desired
result. . . . Thompson's injury was caused by the manner of performance,
implemented by Jensen, over which Jess exercised no direction, control or
supervision. . , .

Thus, because Jess did not actively participate in or otherwise
exercise affirmative control over the manner or method of performance
utilized by Jensen and Thompson, she owed Thompson no duty of care under
the retained control doctrine.
Id. at THf 24, 25.
-n 1 - -• ->;!•>•• > • ^ Ihompsoii v

* r-.. *. .; ;.. •v^-;hN;-

M:^;:;*:

the exerted control has to be over the injury causing aspect of the work in order for there
to be liability. If a general contractor exerts control over another aspect of the work that
did not cause injury , bi it did not exert control o\ e r the aspect of the vv ork th<: it did cai lse
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injury, there is no liability.
For an example of the "narrowness" of the "retained control" standard and it being
"confined in scope to the control asserted," (id. at ^ 15), even assuming Hales & Warner
had asserted control over one aspect of the lifting of the wall involved in the accident, and
also assuming that this one aspect over which Hales & Warner asserted affirmative control
did not cause Jason Smith's injury, there would be no duty under Thompson.
Turning to the facts, the undisputed facts show that Hales & Warner did not exert
affirmative control over the injury-causing aspect of Jason Smith's work, (even assuming
that it was the method by which he and the other Egbert employees were placing the wall
onto the bolts which caused injury).l Thus, under the standard enunciated and elaborated
by the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson, Hales & Warner owed no duty to Jason Smith,
and the trial court order of summary judgment should be affirmed..
B.

In Order for Hales & Warner to Owe a Duty, the Thompson "Retained
Control" Standard Requires that Smiths Establish the Affirmative
Exertion of the Degree of "Control" to the Extent that the
Subcontractor is Prohibited from Doing the Work the
Subcontractor's Own Way.

In the discussion above of Thompson, particular focus has been given to the
language therein requiring that the affirmative exertion of control be over the "injurycausing aspect of the work." In this subsection, we would like to focus on the language in
the Thompson Court discussing the degree of affirmative "control" that must be exerted

'Note, there is no evidence that the (Egbert Construction) method by which they (i.e. Jason
Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis), were placing the wall on the foundation bolts was an unsafe
method.
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in order to impose a duty (on Hales & Warner). In discussing the "retained control"
exceptioi 1 to the general i: i lie of nonliability tl le I hompson Court expressly states as to
the degree of control required, that the general contractor "must exert such control over
the means utilized that the [sub]contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of
the work in his or her own vv av." I d at f 21 (emphasis added).
As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court illustrated the requisite level of
coiiti ol o v ei the subcontractor' s \ v ork \ hich is required in disci issing the Lewis case Id
at |^f 22, 23. The Thompson Court points out that it was not enough that the general
contractor, after noticing that the roof had been improperly installed, ordered it to be

control over the subcontractor employees "and instructed that a quicker but lesser method
be implemented." Id- at ^ 22, 23 (emphasis added). The court refers to "the dangerous
condition created bv the general contractor's method." The Thompson Court points out
that the Lewis court concluded, "on the basis of these facts, that the general contractor
exercised sufficient control over the means used ....... v n. ...
subject it to retain control liability." Id. at f 23.
' I he Thompson Court also points out as to the control asserted, that for an
i mposition of a cii it; ' :
, , , i is not enough that he [the general contractor] has merely a
general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress
or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need
not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations.
Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean
that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to
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operative detail."
Id. at ^f 20 (underlining added).
In summary, not only must there be an affirmative exertion of control by the
general contractor over the injury-causing aspect of Jason Smith's work, that exertion of
control must be to the degree that Jason Smith could not "carry out the injury-causing
aspect of the work in his or her own way." Id. at ^ 21. Here, as Smiths admit, there is no
evidence that Hales & Warner affirmatively took control over the method of the work
being performed by Jason Smith at the time of the accident, (i.e. placing the wall onto the
bolts), prohibited Jason Smith (or Egbert Construction) from using their own method as
to the placement of that wall onto the bolt, and required Jason Smith (and Egbert
Construction) to use a different, less safe, and dangerous method.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Hales & Warner owed a duty
to Jason Smith. In particular, and among other things, Plaintiffs have failed to establish
that (1) Hales & Warner affirmatively exerted the required degree of "control" and (2)
that the control was over "the injury-causing aspect" of the work of Jason Smith.
As a more extreme example to highlight the point being made here, Hales &
Warner would owe no duty even assuming (for argument purposes) that Hales & Warner
had only "recommended," but had not "required," that Egbert Construction instruct Jason
Smith to place the subject wall onto the foundation stud bolts by using an unsafe method,
and that unsafe method caused Jason Smith's injury; (although such action by Hales &
Warner did not actually occur).
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Moreover, not only is Smiths' position directly contrary to the policy enunciated
in i hompson (of charging the responsibility foi pre^ anting risk to the person in acti lal
control), Plaintiffs' position is also contrar) to other policies, including policies
underlying the Utah comparative fault scheme, (and only being held responsible for one's
••J,-'*
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implications of Smiths' position are significant and far-reaching.
v\ c w in point out that as tc its ruling, the trial coin: t judge thoroughly re v ie vv ed the
factual record (including the cited deposition testimony), and the law, including in
particular the Thompson case. (R. 1058, p. 5,11. 8-10, R. 105°. n. 6.11. 19-24, p. 75/> In

and re-read Thompson, before issuing its ruling. (R. 1059, p. 74,11. 22-25, p. 75 1. 1. i The
court then gave a thorough and detailed ruling covering approximately 18 pages. (K. i J: v.
pp. 75 92 )

• •

.

- .

Judge Laycock states in her ruling, among many other things:
I think the testimony in the depositions makes it clear that those
three employees [Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis] were never
under the direction of Maurice Egbert who was the superintendent for Hales
and Warner. They were under the supervision, the instruction and the
direction of Ken Egbert. That was the person that Michael Lewis said
showed him how to put up a wall, how to build a wall, a, down on the, the
ground level... before it was put up. There [sic] was Ken Egbert that gave
him his education on the job . . . .
I have no facts before me that persuade me that Maurice Egbert ever
interfered with, in any way, the way in which Egbert Construction did its
work under the Thompson case.
And particularly with reference to the, the wall that was being
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constructed on the date of the plaintiffs death. That wall was supervised by
Ken Egbert and apparently a man named Manny. And it was after lunch that
Manny instructed these three men including the plaintiff to put that wall up.
Maurice Egbert was in the trailer at the time and had no involvement in that
wall.
(R. 1059, pp. 77-79.)
(i) The CPB/Hales & Warner Contract
Smiths assert in their second issue on appeal that CPB (not Hales & Warner) owed
a duty to Jason Smith due to the terms of the CPB/Hales & Warner contract. However,
Hales and Warner will make a number of points relating thereto.
First, there is no contract between Hale & Warner and Egbert Construction.
Second, although such is irrelevant as to Hales & Warner because Hales & Warner
did not have a contract with Egbert Construction, the Thompson Court states that contract
rights to "order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports,
to make suggestions or recommendations" "or to prescribe alterations and deviations"
"does not mean that the [sub] contractor is controlled as to his methods of work or as to
operative detail." Id. at % 20.
Moreover, even though the CPB contract is irrelevant as to Hales & Warner's
relationship with Jason Smith and Egbert Construction, we will note that the trial court
pointed out in her ruling, after citing the Thompson language referred to immediately
above:
And so all of those things that were listed by plaintiff in the memo
a, coming out of the contract I find do not change the status of Hales and
Warner as an independent contractor, and they also do not become the
equivalent of retaining control.. ..
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(R. 1059, p.84,11. 22 - 25, p. 85, p. 86/11 1-7.)
. •• :r

•

'se Hooker v. Department o; 1 ransportaiion,

38 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2002) supports summary judgment in Hales & Warner's favor. Noie.
the California Supreme Court referred to and quoted

from

upreme C-ui:

decision of Thompson. I he Hooker Court states:
Under Kinney, . . . mere retention of the ability to control safety
conditions is not enough." [A] general contractor owes no duty of care to an
employee of a subcontractor to prevent or correct unsafe procedures or
practices to which the contractor did not contribute by direction, induced
reliance, or other affirmative conduct. The mere failure to exercise a power
to compel the subcontractor to adopt safer procedures does not, without
more, violate any duty owed to the plaintiff. . .
I he Kinney court, we conclude, ci"-' ••"•
decisions in Privette and Toland. . . .

-. - .

of oi u

Id. at 1087-1088. In Hooker, the court went on to discuss Kenney, stating:
I h e question, as the Kinney court framed it, was "whether a general
contractor who claims the power to control all safety procedures on the
worksite may be liable to the injured employee of a subcontractor for
failing to direct the subcontractor to take safety precautions where there is
no evidence that any conduct by the general contractor contributed
affirmatively to the injuries." (Kinney, supra, 87 Cal. App.4th at p. 30.)
Kinney answered that question in the negative.
Id. Thus, and lastly as to this sub-subpoint, based upon the authority above, contract
pro1' ' isions (regardless of their cont snt), io not impose such a duty; oi il;> 1:1: le exertion of
affirmative control (over the injury causing aspect of the work) imposes a duty.
r

Even Under Appellants/Plaintiffs Smith Erroneously Asserted
Standard, There Still Would Be No Liability Because Hales & Warner
Did Not Affirmatively Exert Control Over the Non-Injury Related
Aspects of Jason Smith's Work.
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Although the Thompson standard requires affirmative exertion of control over the
injury causing aspect of the work, Hales & Warner will point out that Hales & Warner
would still prevail even under the standard erroneously asserted by Smiths. Even if, as
Smiths assert, the standard only required affirmative exertion of control over a nonrelated and non-injury causing aspect of the means utilized in the work of Jason Smith (or
Egbert Construction), there would still be no liability imposed upon Hales & Warner
herein.
Even under the erroneous standard asserted by Smiths, the general contractor must
still exert such control over the "non-injury" methods utilized that the subcontractor
cannot carry out that part of the work in the subcontractors own way. In addition, the
Thomspon Court states that it is not enough that the general contractor has general rights
to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to
make suggestions or recommendations, or to prescribe alterations and deviations; and the
Utah Supreme Court further states that such rights "does not mean that the [sub]contractor
is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail." Id. at ^| 20.
In this case at bar, Smiths cannot meet their own erroneous standard. The two
referenced instances as to Hales & Warner actions do not rise to the required level of
control, (let alone cause injury). For example, as to the first instance, instructing Egbert
Construction to "comply with the plans" as to the height of a wall is not even exerting
control over the method utilized, let alone exerting sufficient control. As to the second
instance, merely recommending that studs above the top plate not be cut until a later time
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is not taking control, let alone affirmatively exerting the required and sufficient control
I

* »-• :;*»w*:' *

1 hompson)

•

•
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W e will here also address a number of Smiths' other meritless arguments. In
Smiths' Brief, Smiths discuss a number of cases from other courts as though they are
controlling over the Utah Supreme Court's own "elaboration on the contours of the
standard" in Thompson. Smiths refer to and discuss at some length Simon v. Deerv O i l
0vs i • ,

,

• M. >ewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 2 ) 4 {1C ' 1 :1

1979), Texaco, Inc v. Pruitt 396 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1968), and Erwin v. Kern River Gas
Transmission Co., 1997 WL 804238. While the Thompson Court initially cites to these
cases

Ihompson • -

immediately thereafter states that: "Elaboration of the contours of the standard is needed,
however." Id. at ^ 18 (emphasis added). Ihe fhompson Court then goes on to elaborate
the contours of the standard in its paragraphs 19 through 24, which paragraphs Hales &
Warner has discussed above in detail and at length.
'f>

1 hompson • v

xiu.v,

general contractor "must exert such control over the mean utilized that the [sub] contractor
cannot carry out the injury causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." Id. at Tf 21
(brackets added).
The standard elaborated in Thompson is the controlling standard, not any standard
• : • t i nterpretation set fc i th in Simon, Sewell, Texaco, or Erwin, \ -*..x t.><. ? . i- u standards
in those other cases are in any way different than the standard elaborated in Thompson; and
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Smiths' assertions otherwise are meritless and inaccurate.
Moreover, while page limitation does not allow for a more detailed discussion of
such, certain assertions made by Smiths' counsel as to those other cases are not
completely accurate. For example, contrary to Smiths' counsel's assertions otherwise,
Erwin expressly states that the injury must be caused by the act of performance (or
exertion) over which the general contractor exercised control. See Erwin, 1977 Tex. App.
Lexis 6685, at *9, *21. In any event, nothing in those cases, (even if Thompson did not
set forth the standard), preclude summary judgment in Hales & Warner's favor.
In Smiths' Brief, Smiths' inaccurately assert that the Thompson Court' s "elaboration
on the contours of the standard" ends after paragraph 19 of the Thompson decision. A
simple reading of the Thompson case indicates that this assertion by Smiths is false; and
the Court's elaboration goes on to paragraph 24. In fact, Smiths' counsel took the same
position with the trial court; and during oral argument the trial court was critical of Smiths'
assertion, and disagreed with such. (See R. 1059, p. 55.) In the trial court's ruling, the
Court also referred to the fallacy of Plaintiffs' argument. (See R. 1059, p. 89,11. 9-25, p.
90,11. 1-2.)
Moreover, as to Smiths' discussion of other "authorities," to the extent that they
are in any way consistent with the actual standard set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in
Thompson, they are inapplicable.
2.

This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court Based Upon Plaintiffs'
Stipulation That If the Standard in Thompson v. Jess Requires That
Hales & Warner Exerts Affirmative Control Over the "Injury Causing
Aspect of the Work/' Then Smiths "Lose."
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During the second oral argument hearing, Smiths' counsel represented to the court

"injury causing aspect of the work," "then we [Smiths] lose" on the Appellees' motions for
summary judgment, i

<. p. - o . , . < _-_:. p. v,.,.. 1-6, attached hereto as Attachment

"7," brackets added.) The trial court referenced Smiths' counsel's representation in the
trial court's Summary Judgment Order; the Summary Judgment Order states:
rhe Court notes that Plaintiffs' [Smiths'] counsel stipulated on the
record in oral argument that if the standard for the "retained control"
exception (to the general rule) set forth in Thompson relates to the "injurycausing aspect of the work," that Plaintiffs cannot meet the "retained
control" exception, and that Defendants Hales & Warner's and the CPB's
motions for summary judgment should be granted.
Vx^.

xUJ8, Attachment " 1 , " brackets added.)
As discussed above, the Thompson Court expressly states as to the "retained

^.- r • * -^ \ ^ i j < ^
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exertion of control has t : 1: e : < e i ' '"the iniur\

causing aspect of the work." Thompson, 1999 UT 22, at ^[ 20, 21. Thus, based upon
Smiths' counsel's stipulation, and areading of the Thompson case, this court should affirm
the trial court's ruling.
Note, this stipulation is a stipulation by Smiths' counsel as to facts. As this court
has st'Mc:

.

,,,L i.;*.

(unless good cause is shown for relief); and stipulations made by an attorney may not he
disregarded or set aside at will. See e,g. DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 8 So I'.Ju : vJ.
595 (Utah Ct. App 1995).
A party, through their attorney, is not allowed to make such a stipulation to the trial
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court, particularly where the trial court may have relied, at least in part, on that stipulation
in making its decision, and then on appeal take a different position.
While we have addressed the facts above that show Hales & Warner did not exert
control over the injury-causing aspect of the work, the point here is that this court need
not even review the facts based upon Plaintiffs' stipulation to the trial court. The only
thing this court needs to review is the Thompson case; and if this court agrees with Hales
& Warner that the Thompson case requires affirmative exertion of control over "the
injury-causing aspect" of the work, this court should affirm the trial court's order on that
basis alone.
3.

Appellant/Plaintiffs Smiths Stipulated in the First Hearing that for
there to be a duty the Standard Required Affirmative Exertion of
Control Over "the Injury-Causing: Aspect" of the Work,

At the initial oral argument hearing, Smiths' counsel agreed with Hale & Warner's
position that the Thompson standard does require the exertion of control oyer "the injury
causing aspect of the work." For example, at the initial oral argument hearing, Smiths'
counsel stated:
I'll agree with Mr. Davenport that if he has one paragraph in one
affidavit that goes to the narrow issue at hand he's entitled to, his client is
entitled to summary judgment....
. . . And I don't see how those facts will help this Court determine
that not one or more of the defendants did not exercise affirmative control
over the manner, method and means of the injury causing aspect of the
work. . . .
(See R. 1058, Attachment "8," p.30, 11. 16-25, p. 31, 11. 1-2, underlining added.) For
another example, Smiths' counsel also stated in the initial oral argument hearing:
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THE JUDGE: Tell me what you think you're going to find in your
discovery, or that you should find in your discovery that's going to get you
past the case law
MR. BADARUDDIN: Well, the case law doesn't say you can't sue
a general, well, it doesn't say you can't recover against a general contractor
or an owner.
THE JUDGE: Right.
]\1R. BADARUDDIN: It says if the general contractor actively
participates or exercises control over the means, method, manner of
accident causing injury, accident causing work, the plaintiff can recover.
Those, those are the sort of facts we hope to establish... .
(See R. 1058, Attachment "8," p. 37.11. 10-22, underlining added.)
"; . .v Sinilhi n funnel agtccil and icpresealal lu llu hi,J omit m lla In si lummy
that the "retained control" standard did relate to the (exertion of control over the) "injury
causing aspect of the work." At the initial hearing, Smiths were seeking additional time
to condi ict fi n ther disco\ er\

Afteradditional disco v en w as sondi icted. v' v hicli discos • eiy

showed that Hale & Warner did nut exert affirmative control over the injury-causing
aspect of J ason Smith' s "\ v orl c, Smiths changed their position as to what the "retained
control" standard is (in Thompson).
It appears that one has to conclude that Smiths' counsel has agreed or stipulated

the first hearing that the "retained control" standard relates to the (exertion of control over
the) "injury-causing aspect of the work." and {.

.-.,:;,;:,

counsel's representation

(stipulation) to the court in the second hearing that Smiths' "lose" if the retains.
standard relates to the (exertion of control over the) "injury-causing aspect of the work."
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On this separate basis, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
In Smiths' "Appellant's Memorandum in Response to Opposing Appellee's Motion
for Summary Deposition'Tiled with this appellate court, Smiths admit that counsel can
stipulate to facts. As discussed above, the second stipulation made by Smiths' counsel
during the second oral argument was a stipulation as to the facts.
As to the other stipulation made by Smiths' counsel in the first oral argument, in
Smiths' "Appellant's Memorandum in Response to Opposing Appellee's Motion for
Summary Deposition," Smiths cite to the dissenting opinion of Associate Chief Justice
Russon in Rivera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2000 Utah 36.
However, Justice Russon points out in that dissenting opinion that: "Parties can stipulate
to facts, and such stipulations are generally binding on the court. Parties can sometimes
even stipulate as to conclusions of law, such as liability." Id. at ^| 27 (citation omitted,
emphasis added).
Note also that Justice Russon, in his dissent, indicates that the stipulated statement
involved therein related to the legal effect of the stipulation; and if such is the case, the
majority in Rivera upheld the stipulation even though it related to the legal effect of the
stipulated facts.
Thus, Smiths have apparently stipulated away their case.
4.

Smiths Have Failed to Meet, and Cannot Meet Their Burden of
Establishing that Hales & Warner "Breached" a Duty Owed to Jason
Smith

Smiths not only have the burden of establishing that Hales & Warner owed Jason
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Smith a duty, Plaintiffs also have the burden of establishing "a breach of that duty." See

v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).)
Smiths have not, and cannot, meet their burden of establishing that Haic^ OL W arner
"breached" a duty owed to Jason Smith. This issue was briefed and argued to the trial
court below (See R. 991-992, and R. 1059, pp. 24-25, 72-74.)
'VV eha\ e discussed abo >»/ e the fact that Smiths can note v en establish that a di ity , ' as
owed. However, this Court should not overlook the fact that Smiths also cannot establish
the elements of "breach" (and "causation"). As the TTtah Supreme Court indicates in
Ihompspr.. ..
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•- :i;itions ^ "i"/ of reasonable

care under the circumstances and is confined in scope to the control asserted."
Thompson, lUoi« « - _ . * . . .
Normally, if Appellants/Plaintiffs Smiths were able to show that a duty existed, the
next requirement would be for Smiths to show that it was breached. Plaintiffs have not

element, the Thompson Court refers to the Lewis case, where the general contractor not
onl> affirmatively took control (of the method being utilized by the subcontractor), but
required that a "quicker" and "unsafe" method be implemented, which "created" a
"dangerous condition." Id at f 22.
I liiis, a s the Thompson v

•

,..-.*!

a duty, but the Smiths must establish that there was a breach of that duty after the exertion
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of control where Hales & Warner required the subcontractor or its employee to
implement a "less safe method,"creating a dangerous condition. Plaintiffs have not, and
cannot, show such a breach.
Now, although there is no evidence that it was the manner in which the subj ect wall
was placed on the bolts which caused Jason Smith's injury, for the purposes of illustration
here, we will assume that it was the manner in which Jason Smith placed the subject wall
accident onto the bolts which caused his injury.
Under this assumption, not only would Smiths be required to show that Hales &
Warner exerted control over the method utilized to place the subject wall onto the bolts,
Smiths would also have to prove that Hales & Warner instructed that an unreasonable,
unsafe, and dangerous method be used. In other words, even under this assumed
hypothetical if Hales & Warner took control over this aspect of the work, but instructed
Jason Smith and the others assisting him to use a safe method, there would be no liability.
The trial court stated as to this issue:
Well, I think the way that I've approached it where I found that
there's actually been no duty it leaves me having to say hypothetically if
there had been a duty then I don't have any facts to support a breach.
(See R. 1059, p. 91,11. 11-14, Attachment "7.")
The trial Judge goes on to state that she "will hang my hat, on the finding that
there's no duty of care on the part of these two defendants and leave it at that." (See R.
1059, 11. 11-19.) While the trial court decided not to reach a decision on the "breach"
issue under the circumstances, it is still Hales & Warner's position that Plaintiffs have
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not, and cannot, meet their burden of establishing breach, and that such is another valid

that this Court rule in Hales & Warner's favor on this point.
5.

Smiths Have Not, and Cannot, Meet Their Burden
of Showing "Causation."

Smiths also have the burden of establishing that Hales & Warner breach of a duty
owed Jason Smith "caus[ed], both actually and proximately," injury to Jason Smith. See
Weber \. Soring hL LiV*.

-•"

;-<.-*- aing _v\jjjuuns

v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).
Smiths have not, and cannot, meet their burden of showing that a breach of a duty
owed to Plaintiff "caused, both actually and proximately," injury to Jason Smith. (This
issue was also briefed and argued at the trial court level. (See R. 990-991, and R. 1059,
I >p. 2f 29.)
In the Thompson Court's initial citation to Lewis v. N. J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc.,
the Court pointed out that Lewis case was a case "imposing liability where subcontractor's
en iplo> ee w as iiiji ire d as a result PT

•
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general contractor." See Thompson, 1979 U T 2 2 , f 19. Attachment "9."
t \,s to the facts of this case, the " " :aiise' " of J ason Smith' 's injury could have been
Jason Smith: merely failing to follow an appropriate method; otherwise acting (himself)
inappropriately; etc. Moreover, there is no evidence that negligence of Hales & Warner
"caused" *

-

Springville Citv, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986V
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. . . A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at
best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for
the defendant.
Id. at 1367-68 (part of emphasis in original and part of emphasis added).
Here, there isn't even a possibility of causation (as to Hales & Warner).
As noted above, the trial court decided not to reach this issue because she found
that there was no duty. However, again, we believe that this separate basis is a valid basis
supporting judgment in favor of Hales & Warner, and request judgment of this basis also.
6.

Hales & Warner Was An Independant Contractor,
and Was Not An Employee of CPB

In Smiths' Brief, Smiths assert as their third and last issue on appeal:
3. Whether the relationship of principle employer and independent
contractor can exist when the principle employer possesses the right to accept
or reject any subcontractor or employee selected by the purported independent
contractor.
(Brief of Appellants, p. 6.) Smiths argue in there Brief that because "CPB had the authority
to hire and fire employees and subcontractors of Appellee H & W," Hales & Warner was the
employee of CPB and not an independent contractor. (Brief of Appellants, p. 46.)
Smiths' arguments are meritless and fail for a number of reasons. First, contrary to
Smiths' inaccurate assertions otherwise, the CPB/Hales & Warner contract does not give
CPB the right to hire or fire Hales & Warner's employees (or anyone else's employees); and
the contract provisions cited by Smiths' do not state such. (See R. 262-263, Sections
5.1(A),(B), 6.1(A).) Further, Smiths' assertions as to the contract language pertaining to
subcontractors is not entirely accurate, and the cited provisions do not state that CPB can
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"fire" subcontractors once they are contracted with.
Note In an;; • ? rent e\ e n if Smiths' assertions were acci urate w hichthe> are ri, ;:>t si i :li
would not make Hales & Warner an employee of CPB, as more fully discussed in the parts
of ihe Brief oi Appellee

. - rw\er:... . .-..

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allow a party to "adopt by reference
any part of the brief of another." Utah R. App. P. 24(h). In the interests of brevity, Hales &

the Brief of Appellee CPB.
A. v_ /!:> ;. dicates immediately after that discussion - - tan ia>, on this point:
"If w e look at the factors, mentioned above, such as control over the day to day
work, as opposed to merely influencing the result to be achieved, the method
of payment, that is, wages v. payment for a completed project, the furnishing
of equipment, etc. The relationship between the CPB and Hales & Warner was
clearly that of the owner and independent contractor, not employer/employee.
In sum, Hales & Warner was not the employee of CPB.
However, even if Hales & Warner was the employee of CPB, which it wasn't, such
• '^

" lal "is & Wai rr 'zr (c r CI *B) tc Smiths; Smiths v • : n ill :!! still

have the burden of showing: (1) a duty owed to Jason Smith by Hales & Warner; (2) breach
c f tliii::: it cliit; < ; arid (3) causation, I: • : th actuall} and proximately, of the injury. A s discussed
above, Smiths have not, and can not, meet their burden in showing any of these three essential
elements, (let alone all of them).
7.

Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief of Appellee C P B .

Appellee Hales & Warner has received the "Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief

of Appellee CPB. While Hales & Warner does not have adequate space to fully address such,
Hales & Warner would like to point out that in Smiths' reply brief, Smith have improperly
raised several new issues/arguments including: the argument that Brent Reynolds was an
employee of CPB; the argument that Egbert Construction was an employee of CPB; the
argument that CPB, as a landowner, retained control over Hales & Warner, Brent Reynolds
Construction and Egbert Construction, and failed to take reasonable care to protect the
employees of the contractors; the arguments that CPB could be liable under the "peculiar
risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrines; and the argument that CPB is liable because
it failed to warn Jason Smith of hazards present on the land.
Further, as to the cases and authority cited by Appellees in their reply brief, Appellees
have in some instances misinterpreted the law and/or have failed to address the findings of the
respective courts in full.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that Restatement (Second) of Torts §§413,416 and 427
apply in this case. Their argument is clearly erroneous, and against well established Utah law.
Those Restatements deal with the "peculiar risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrines.
The Thompson Court found that these doctrines does not apply in cases where an injured
person is an employee of an independent contractor, such as in this case; rather the "peculiar
risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrine only applies to innocent "third parties."
Thompson. 1999 UT 22, at 1130-3 h P. 329.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the discussion above, Hales & Warner requests that the court affirm the
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trial court summary judgment order, (or otherwise enter judgment in favor of Hales &
Warner and against Smiths).
In addition, Hales & Warner requests that the court grant Hales & Warner's
:cqu^L' i' -•;...,

_
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.:.: Liu runiviiiL; •

-._..:.;..^ Ow;\^.. >;i pages

of various depositions attached to Smiths' brief, and which are not a part of the "Record"
on appeal; (2) new issues and arguments, including such based upon documents which are

statements, including hearsay statements in letters prepared by Brent Reynolds and the
deposition testimony of Brent Reynolds, aua i'uuiuirts" references to and arguments based
upon such; etc.
Dated this / / c S T o f May, 2004.
SIS II I I I & , GLAT ISER

•

"

•

felCHARD K. GLAUSER
ERIC K. DAVENPORT
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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•

/ f f e f M . n

^ ,

.

•

• ' ;

foregoing was served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their
name, by depositing a true and correct copy of said document in a properly addressed
envelope, postage prepaid to the following;
Edward P. Moriarity
Jeffrey D. Gooch
Justin T. Ashworth
SPENCE, MORIARITY & SCHUSTER
39 Exchange Place, # 10 i
Salt Lake City, Utah 84i 11
Robert R. Wallace
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Joseph C. Minnock
MORGAN, MEYER & RI (' E
136 South Main, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Shandor Badaruddin
MORIARITY, GOOCH & BAP • •
124 West Pine Street, Suite B
Missoula, Montana 59802
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Richard K. Glauser, #4324
Eric K. Davenport, #5684
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
7351 So. Union Park Ave., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
Telephone: (801)562-5555
Attorneys for Hales &
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IN THE FOURT- JUL ' C I - - DISTRiC"

Uepufy

;UF " IN AND FOR

UT,~,r-,

KELLY SMITH and LISA NIELSEN,
Individually and as Heirs of JASON
KELLY SMITH, Deceased,
Plaintiffs,

HALES & WARNER CONST- .
INC., a Utah Corporation;
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a
Utah Corporation,

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF HALES & WARNER
CONSTRUCTION, INC., AND THE
CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS

Defendants.

HALES & WARNER CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah Corporation,

Civil No. 020401834
Judge Claudia i ay^ock

Third-Party Plaintiff,

BRC, INC. a.k.a. BRENT REYNOLDS
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
II,

ifrillddlit.

UU1

Defendant "Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against
Plaintiffs" and the "Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" came before this Court
on August 20,2003. Shandor Badaruddin, Jeffrey D. Gooch and Justin T. Ashworth appeared
on behalf of Plaintiffs; and the Plaintiffs also appeared at the hearing. Eric K. Davenport
appeared on behalf of Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. (hereinafter "Hales & Warner");
Clifford T. Hales of Hales & Warner was also present. Robert R. Wallace appeared on behalf
of the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(hereinafter the "CPB"). Steven G. Morgan appeared on behalf of BRC, Inc., aka Brent
Reynolds Construction, Inc., (hereinafter "BRC"). Oral argument was received on August 20,
2003 from counsel for the parties.
The Court will note that after the initial memoranda in support and opposition to these
motions had been filed, the Court held a hearing on November 19,2002, and signed an order
on January 31,2003, which order provided that the parties "shall have until February 28,2003
to conduct and complete additional fact discovery;" the order also referred to the filing of
supplemental memoranda by the parties after the additional discovery referred to was
completed. After additional discovery was conducted, Plaintiffs, Hales & Warner and the CPB
filed supplemental memoranda pertaining to the motions for summary judgment. Thereafter,
supplemental oral argument on the motions for summary judgment was scheduled for August
20, 2003, as referenced above.
The Court, having reviewed the motions and memoranda submitted in support and in
opposition to the motions, and having heard oral argument on the motions, hereby enters the
2

GO 1

following order for good cause shown:
I

-E -:.-:; ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that "Hales & Warner

Construction, Inc. s Motion for Summary Judgment aaainrt Plainriffc" aiui in

I imn n n i

Summary Judgment of the Defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" are hereby qrantecl
The Court finds that there are no material disputes of fact which preclude summary
judgment in favor of Hales i V " ' " -

•

"

~

-

;

,—

, &. •-_, titts' counsel

agreed during oral argument that there was no dispute as to the material facts.
<r hi i ih. 111 l.«,

li"l,LJ Hit U - b entered an agreement with Hales & Warner for the

construction of a cnurch house for the Highland 4 th and 20th Wards. On or about May 10,
1^Qu

Hakr

•

-Ji fiileiyd into a subcontract agreement with BRC. unaer WHICH

subcontract agreement BRC was to perform: "All of the Sectr- " ^ ' 'r •
. -^

j

: „.,; ai;.. ^,- -abor and materials, all material handling and crane time, except wood

trusses to be supplied by others but installed by BRC Inr "BPr Pntf-rm I in I u

ml --on tract

with "Egbert Construction, Inc.," (hereinafter "Egbert Construction"), wherein BRC was to
provide the materials, and Egbert Constn n Urm \, ^ \n pn n I A HI I Am,

dh

i<. Am lection

Ub luu rough carpentry.
Egbert Construction hired am Hi nrnA A* mi AMIAII i in iidmi r »i'.> JIIU JOSU LUUIS.
c.-.

.m_m; 13, 1999, an Egbert Construction supervisor instructed Jason Smith, Michael

Lewis, and Jose Louis tc upii1 M| ' n vmnrfen fnnin'J wall Egbtfil construction had buill. On
August 13, 1999, Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis raised the wooden framed
wall, and were in tlv- j |vnr;e« ^f pnttinj tl i j I J A I M ] , „ ..studs when the wall started to fall and
3
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fell on Jason Smith, causing Jason Smith's death (hereinafter the "Accident").
The Court finds that it is undisputed that it was Egbert Construction who hired, trained
and educated Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis as it relates to the work being
performed at the time of the Accident. Hales & Warner and the CPB did not hire, train or
educate Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis as to the work they were performing at
the time of the Accident.
The Court finds that it is undisputed that Plaintiff Jason Smith was an employee of
Egbert Construction priortoand atthetimeof the Accident. Michael Lewis and Jose Louis
were also employees of Egbert Construction prior to and at the time of the Accident.
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis were under the
direction, supervision, instruction and control of Egbert Construction at the time of the
Accident.
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were not under the
direction, supervision, instruction orcontrol of Hales & Warnerorthe CPB priorto and atthe
time of the Accident. The Court finds that there is no evidence that Jason Smith, Michael
Lewis and Jose Louis were ever under the direction, supervision, instruction, or control of
Hales & Warner or the CPB.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB instructed
Egbert Construction or its employees (or BRC or its employees) to do the work being
performed at the time of the Accident in a different manner or by way of a different method.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB exerted
control over the means utilized by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis, in doing the
4

Oulu

work Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were performing at the time of the Accident,
or that Hales & Warner m tin

|0

PR mrprWpH ' im in.n /

The Court finds that the employee of Hales & Warner on the site at the time of the
Accident wn* in tlm i mi IIIM h

In nlm rniil hi i I

n involvement as to the work being

performed, and the wall being put into place, by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Josat Hi--- lime i*»f thr - m ii'lr^ni.
The Court also finds that there was no employee or representative nfthe cpp, -n Hi •
site a' •* -

Accident, and no employee or representative of the CPB had any

involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith, Mirn^ni i emi^
tt :

i j . ise u "ins HI

:.j „ m e Accident
The Court finds that the evidence indicates t licit if >m*ib Egheif > niioiiui LIUII u ho was

controlling the means utilized and the manner of performance of the work being performed by
Jason Smith, Michael Lew ~

•

,-*.-* ^

.,__ _-:;w

The Utah Supreme Court decision Thompson v. Jeffs, 1999 Utah 22, 972 2d. 322, is
applicable, r *

. .-

m the motions for summary

judgment as to both Hales & Warner and the CPB. In its analysis section, the Utah Sijpreme
Court in Thompson \nrA self. Ii mil niu general rule, stating:
Utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an
act or omission of the contractor or his servants."
This general rule
recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not
participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed
owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of
performance implemented.
id. at fl 13 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court wen'

i » i^mi

. Hm tin

mn

5
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exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an employer of an independent contractor,"
including the "retained control" doctrine exception.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated on the record in oral argument that
if the standard for the "retained control" exception (to the general rule) set forth in Thompson
relates to the "injury-causing aspect of the work," that Plaintiffs cannot meet the "retained
control" exception, and that Defendants Hales & Warner's and the CPB's motions for
summary judgment should be granted.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met, and cannot meet, the "retained control"
exception to the general rule, pursuant to the contours of that standard outlined in Thompson.
In discussing the contours of the "retained control" exception and the "active participation"
requirement pertaining thereto, the Thompson Court states, among other things:
In other words, to have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal
employer must have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative
detail of that work. "The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal
duty must involve either the direct management of the means and method of the
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the specific equipment
that caused the injury."
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, If 20 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court also points out that
there must be exertion "of such control over the means utilized that the contractor cannot carry
out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." id. at fl 2 1 .
Hales & Warner and the CPB did not exert affirmative control over the method or
operative detail of the work and did not directly manage the means and methods of Egbert
Construction's work nor provide the specific equipment used by Egbert Construction as to the
work Jason Smith was performing at the time of the Accident.

6
•*

f
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As referenced in the above quote, the standard set forth in Thompson also indicates
that the exertion of control over the means utilized must relate fn the "iniury-causinq aspect of
the work." ]d. (underlining added). Hales & Warner and the CPB did not exert control over
the means i itilized as tc • tl le "ill iji n ) : ai isii ig aspect ol ' til i e } 'oi I ;:1 • : 1 ' lasoi i Sr i litl i, (ex ei i
assuming the means utilized caused his death); rather, Egbert Construction controlled the
mean is i itilized as tc tl ie * \ '• : i ! : Ias> : •! i Si \ litl i was pei foi i i iii ig at the tii neof the Accident. The
activities of Hales & Warner and the CPB to which Plaintiffs refer did not relate to, and were
in 11 .tn tiAttiln -n -11 : jiiln il w e t , the work Jasor. J;, :th was performing at the time of the
accident, and did not cause the accident and death of Jason Smith.
I i ie Court also finds that Hales & Warner and its employees were not employees of
the CPB; the Court finds that Hales & Warner was an independent - ntra- I'M ' f t h P ^ P R .
F urther, the contracts and their provisions do not preclude summary judgment in favor of Hales
& Warner and the CPB.
DATED this ^ffU^day otSeptember, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was faxed and mailed,
postage prepaid, this /

v

^ d a y of September, 2003, to:

Jeffrey D. Gooch
SPENCE, MORIARITY & SCHUSTER
39 Exchange Place, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ShandorS. Badaruddin, Esq.
Attorney at Law
The Flood Building
124 West Pine Street, Suite B
Missoula, MT 59802-4222

Robert R. Wallace
60 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Joseph C. Minnock
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE
136 South Main, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXAMINATION L

MR. BADARUDDIN

£EQ.C.E.E.DiNGS.
MICHAEL LEWIS,
; ::
; ] 1 p rl

3 a witness; for and on behalf of the plaintiff,

being first duly sworn, was examined and testified ...
i; ~^1 lows :
EXAMINATION
B Y MR. B A D A R U D D I N :
Q

C a n y o u state y o u r n a m e for m e .

A

Michael Lewis.

Q
A

• A n d M r . L e w i s , w h a t do y on do for a ] 2 < - 2 rig?
Well, currently, I work at a telephone

survey

company called Western Research.
Q

Okay. . What did you do back in August

of 1999?

P.

I was a framer.

Q

A'framer.

A

We frame houses, buildings " >-- -'--• — ""-es.

What is a framer?

Just frame buildings.
Q

And can you tell in'- mo"*-3 spe:: rical.1 "

what

does framing entail?
Building actual framework for a building,
everything from the walls to the floors, the trusses,
he joists, everything'.

Framing the building.

Q

Who did you work for in August of 1999?

A

Egbert Construction.

Q

And when did you start working for Egbert?
f,
U Uf.UGbi.5 t)
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EXAMINATION B* MR. DAVENPORT
16:29

16:29

1

A

Well, he was saying that he was going to put

2

up like a monument or something, a little something in

3

memory of Jason.

4

Q

He expressed some remorse about Jason 1 s death?

5

A

Yes.

6

I don't know if that ever happened or

not, but that's what he told us.'

7

Q

8

this project?

9

A

No.

16:29 i o

Q

Do you know w h e t h e r o r n o t you h a d a n y

11

A

13

16:30 i5

Do you know who the architect was on

discussions with him?

12

14

Okay.

No.

I never personally, no.

MR. BADARUDDIN:

don't.

I appreciate you coming down.
THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry I was late.

17

• MR. BADARUDDIN:

18

MR. DAVENPORT:

19

21
22

Some

of the other gentlemen may have some questions, but I

16

16:30 20

Thank you, Mr. Lewis.

That f s all right.
I've got some.

EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAVENPORT:
Q

Do you want me to call you Mr. Lewis or

"Michael or Mike or what?

23

A

Mike, whatever.

24

Q

Mike, I'm going to probably ask you some of

16:30 25

I don't even care.

the same type of questions, but I just want to make sure

000984
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
I'm clear.

So if you think, well, I already

answered

that, you have, and -A

It's okay, I understand that.

Q

First, I want to make sure that you understand

that Ken Egbert and Ken Egbert Construction are separate
and apart from Maurice Egbert, who was the employee of
Hales & Warner.
You understand that?
•A
Q

Yeah, I understand that.
And in the deposition of Maurice Egbert, as

well as others that have been deposed, and the
affidavits of not only yourself, but the other people
we've obtained affidavits from, from Ken Egbert, all
have indicated that Maurice Egbert, himself, the
employee of Hales & Warner, never gave instructions to
you or Jason Smith or Jose as to going and lifting that
wall.

And that's consistent -with your testimony today;

correct?
A

Yes, that's right.

Q

And also, everybody indicated that Maurice

Egbert did not teach you or Jason Smith how to lift the
wall; is that correct?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

A

Well, to be honest with you, no one- rea-U,
n M,
T.T7VJ WSTTDW

PSR/RPR

i&L
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
his name.

And he told me -- they taught me

they just

showed me how to raise the wall.
MR. DAVENPORT:

Are you saying Maurice Egbert,

the general contractor, or are you saying -THE WITNESS:

Well, Ken Egbert was actually

telling me to do it, but Maurice was there.
was in the' trailer or something.

I think he

I don't know where he

was .
MR. DAVENPORT:

There's a big difference

between -THE WITNESS:
- Q

Okay, sorry.

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

I'm just asking you, what

did Maurice., if anything, tell you to do?
MR. DAVENPORT:

Keep in mind, distinguish Ken

Egbert and Maurice.
THE WITNESS:

Really/ nothing.

Honestly, I

never talked to Maurice more than one or two words, more
than, you know, if I needed to ask him a question or
something.
Q

I never really talked to him very much.
(BY MR. BADARUDDIN) ' Did he ever tell you you

were doing something wrong and to. stop it?.
A

No.

That would more be the other framers .

Q

Who showed you how to raise a wall?

A

Ken Egbert.

Q

Okay.

Ub0J 8 2
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
16:13

16:13

1

A

He taught me the proper way, you know, how to
You don f t want to

2

stand wh en you're holding the wall.

3

stand ri ght up to it.

4

you know , be ready to brace it, and bail if it goes out

5

of the w ay.

You've got to put your foot back,

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

That's what he told me.

8

Q

Do you remember Jason Smith?

9

A

Yes.

16:13 1 0

Q

How did you know Jason Smith?

11

A

He had been working there for maybe like two

12

or three days.

13

Q

Did he get trained along with you?

14

A

No.

16:13 1 5

Q

And what, if anything,- did he do, if you know

16 |

what he

d i d ?

Just a couple of days.

He started after I did.

'

•

•

:

.

.

•

"

17

A

He was the same as I was; he was a. laborer.

18

Q

And he worked for who?

19

A

16:13 2 0

Q

21
22

' He worked for Ken Egbert.
And did you have any' supervisors when you

worked with Ken Egbert?
A

Oh, man.

We had -- there was Ken, and I guess

23

one of the other supervisors, his. name was Manny.

24

then there was this guy named Dale.

16:14 2 5

And

And they were

always f ighting with each other.
UU U U 5 1
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
Q

How, if at all, did they supervise you?

A

Like I said, if I was doing something wrong,

you know, if I was cutting a board wrong, they'd come
tell me.
Q

How did you know what boards to cut or what

walls to build?
A

They would tell me.

See,, usually what I would

do is, I would cut the boards for them, and they would
actually put the boards together, because I was just
learning.

That's kind of hew it goes when you're in

that business.
Q

And so you would cut the boards.

They would

assemble the wall?
A

They'd say, I need 10 boards at 82 and a half

inches or whatever, so I'd go cut 10 boards and bring
them over to them.
Q

Sometimes I would assemble the wall.

. How did you. know how to assemble a wall?

A

I was taught how.

Q

By?

A

By Manny.

Q

Do you know if Jason assembled any walls?

A

You know, I think from most of what I saw him

doing, he did mostly cutting.
Q

Okay.

Did you stand up any walls?

A

Oh, yeah.

A lot of walls.
UbOJdll
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
Q

Who told you h ow to stand up a wall?

A

Ken Egbert.

Q

And how do you stand up a wall ?

A

Well, you -- j ust depending on the size of the
Sometimes, if the wall was a real big wall, we

wall .

would use the forklift, and they'd suspend 1 ike tow
strap s to the top of the . wall and raise the wall with a
forkl if t. . But if it was a smaller wall that we could
lift ourselves, we would stand it.

Someone else would

go around and position the wall into the bolts.

You

know, sometimes they'd use a board and j ack underneath
it • to lift the wall up onto the bolts if it wasn't quite|
on th ere .

You know, there would always be p eople

1 raising the wall.
And then once the wall was up, you put an
A-frame on it.

Once you have it down on the bolts, then

you p ut an A-frame and a brace on it.
Q

But not before 7

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Do you know who Brent R eyno Ids is?
I recognize the name from the legal

papers, but that's it.
Q

But you don't know how, if at all , he was

invol ved :in the framing process?
A

No.

u G 0 'J 7 9
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
I'm clear.

So if you think, well, I already

answered

that, you have, and -A

It's okay, I understand that.

Q

First, I want to make sure that you understand

that Ken Egbert and Ken Egbert Construction are separate
and apart from Maurice Egbert, who was the employee of
Hales & Warner.
You understand that?
A

Yeah, I understand that.

Q

And in the deposition of Maurice Egbert, as

well as others that have been deposed, and the
affidavits of not only yourself, but the other people
we've obtained affidavits from, from Ken Egbert, all
have indicated that Maurice Egbert, himself, the
employee of Hales & Warner, never gave instructions to
you or Jason Smith or Jose as to going and lifting that
And that f s consistent with your testimony today;

wall.

correct?
A

Yes, that's right.

Q

And also, everybody indicated that Maurice

Egbert did not teach you or Jason Smith how to lift the
wall; is that correct?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

A

Well, to be honest with you, no one really

500978
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
Q

Do you know who Brent Reynolds Construction,

Inc. is?
A

I've heard of them.

Q

From the court papers?

A

Yeah.

Q

That I've sent you?

A

Well, just in the construction business,

I've

heard of them.
Q

Do you remember August 13 of 1999?'

A

Was that the day of the accident?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q

Tell me what happened on that day.

A

Well, we had just finished eating lunch, and

there was a wall that had already been built, and
Manny - - I think it was Manny -- told me and Jason and a
guy named Jose to go put it up.
Q

Okay.

And then what happened?

A

So we went over there, and we lifted it up,

and it wasn't quite onto the bolts, so Jason and Jose
were holding it, and I went to go get a board, and I was
going to, you know, try to use the leverage and jack it
up onto the bolts.

And I put it under there, and as

soon as I put some pressure on there, the wall came
down.

Jose bailed out of the way, and it was like
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
16:17

1

Jason, he tried to catch it, and he kind of crouched

2

down.

3

what, it just came down on him.

I don't know if he was trying to catch it or

4
16:17

5

And they lifted the wall up, and Jason was
just laying there.

6

• around his head like this.

7

was going to be serious.

8

or something, but I saw the blood.

9
i6:i7io

At first, I didn't know it
I thought he was knocked out

And we started yelling for help, and Maurice
came out of the trailer, and the other guys, everyone

11

else was working on the east -- yeah, the east side of

12

the church, and there was a big wall already built on

13

that side, so they couldn't really see into the church.

14
16:1815
'16

16:18

There was already a puddle of blood

I don't know if you guys have been out there
and seen the site or anything, but it ! s more on the west
side of the church where it happened.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

So they all came running over from there, and

19

Maurice got his cell phone, called the police, fire

20

department.

21

Q

And an ambulance came?

22

A

Yeah.

And some guy came.that -- I guess he

23

had a scanner or something.

24

was driving by, so he stopped.

16:18 25

He was just a doctor.

He

He got there way before

the ambulance did.

u b u j 7b
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
relates to the wall .actually beginning its fall, it
seems to me, and you correct me if I'm wrong, but you
don't really know why the wall actually started to fall.
You know you were in,the process of jimmying it up, but
other than that, you don't know why it started to fall;
is that a fair statement?
A

That's right.

That's something I've

been

trying to figure out for quite a long time, because my
first reaction was to blame myself.

If I wasn't

jimmying the wall, it wouldn't have fallen, so for a
long time, I thought it was my fault, that I jimmied the
wall and I made it fall, but then -- I just don't know.
Q

But had you previously jimmied walls like that

and that type of. jimmying didn't cause the wall to fall?
A

Yeah, and that's the way I've done it since

then, also.
Q

So at this juncture, you're not saying that

your jimmying caused the wall' to fall; correct?

That's

not your position?
A

But I'm saying, it may have, I don't know.

What I'm saying is, I don't know.
Q

Okay.

Now, did anyone say anything during

this process?. Like once it started to fall, did anybody
yell out, Watch out, or, Get out of the way, or, Run?
A

Yeah, I did, and Jose yelled something in
.—IJUij j j
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Spanish.

I'm not sure what it was.

Q

What did you say?

A

I just -- honestly, I don't remember.

It was

something, Get out of the way, something along the lines
of that.
Q

Did you hear Jason yell anything?

A

No.

Q

Let's assume that he was paying attention

right there.

Once he noticed the wall to start fall, if

he would have just jumped out of the way, would he have
time to do that instead of trying to catch it?
A

Yeah.

If he would have just moved to the side

rather than backwards, he would have been fine.
Q

As I understand it, a wall falling on its own

volition, the initial falling motion, it is not like
someone is on top of it and is throwing it down, it kind
of starts out slowly, as it begins; is that kind of the
movement that occurred here?
A

Yeah.

slow motion.
Q
you,
day.

It was kind of like it all went into

It was weird.

Now, based upon my prior conversation with

I believe you indicated to me that it was a calm
It wasn't real windy or something like that.
A

Yeah, it wasn't super windy or anything.

Q
Z

It was a calm, sunny day; is that a fairr.r ;,n;
'
—
U U ITJ / i
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Tab 3

EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY

|

whether or not you ever saw him on the construction

!

project or not?
I do not remember faces or names real easy.

A

It takes time for me personally to develop a familiarity
with a p erson's face.
•

Where were you located when the wall fell on

Q

Mr. Smith?
A

I was in the job trailer.

Q

How far away from where the wall fell? •

A

Probably 100 feet.

Q

And were there windows looking out over the

project?
A

The door window did look toward the project.

Q

And how did you become aware of the fact that

there ha d been an incident there on the project?
A

One of Ken Egbert's guys came and knocked on

: the door and said we needed to call 911, that there had
!

been an accident.
Q
'A

Who was that?
I don't recall.

Q

What do you recall about him, if anything?

A

I don't remember.

Q

How many employees of Mr. Egbert were on the

It's been too long.

job site on August 13, 1999?
A

|

. I don't remember the exact number.
XTTVT
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT

i4;46 i

an

y

questions.

2

L e t me j u s t

3
4.

i4-*46 5

questions.

EXAMINATION
BY MR.

DAVENPORT:

Q

Did you ever tell Jason Smith how to place

6

that wall on the bolts that are there on the

7

construction site?

8

A

No, I did not.

9

Q

Did you ever instruct or tell any Egbert

;i4:47 I Q
11

employee how to raise that wall or place that wall on
the bolts?

12

A

No, I did not.

13

Q

Did you ever exert control over, firmly take

14
#4:47 15

14:48

a s k a few q u i c k

control over the method that.Jason Smith was using in
placing that wall onto the bolts?

-

16

A

No, I did not.

17

Q

Did you ever firmly exert control over any

18

other employee of Egbert Construction or Brent Reynolds

19

Construction as to the method in which they were placing

20

a wall onto bolts?

21

A

No., I did not.

22

Q

Did you ever affirmatively take control over

23

or exert control over the operative detail of Jason

24

Smith's work relating to the placement of that wall onto

^ 14: 48 2 5

those bolts?

"
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:48

14:48

X

A

No,

I did

not.

2

Q

Did you ever affirmatively take control or

3

exert control over the operative detail of any Egbert

4

employee or Brent Reynolds Construction employee as it

5

relates to the placement of walls onto bolts?

6

A

No, I did not.

7

Q

Did you ever prohibit any Egbert employee or

any Reynolds Construction employee from using the method
they chose in placing a wall onto bolts for that
14;49 J 0 .

construction site?

11

A

No, I did not.

12

Q

As it relates to this construction project, do

13

you know whether or not you were in any.way involved in

14

the bidding process for that job?

14:50 1 5

16
17
18
19
14:50 2 0

21

A

Bidding process itself, no.

Q

As it relates to any project, I just want you

to describe for me as to how involved, if any, have you
been in the past as it relates to the bidding process
for any j ob.
A

Occasionally, Cliff and Joel will talk to

superintendents about how they felt about working with
certain subcontractors and ask for our opinions, how

22

they work, qualities of workmanship, if we like working
23

with them.
24
14:50 2 5

Q

Other than t h a t ,

T7TT/-T

you wouldn't
_
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FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
15:03

^

if that was the same methodology used in raising the

2

wall which fell on Jason Smith.

3
4
15:03

Q

So you didn't see the methodology; isn't that

correct?

5

A

I did not see the methodology.

6

Q

Now, let me ask you another question.

7

Did you

approve the methodology that was used in the raising of
the wall that killed Jason Smirh?

15:03 1 0

11

A

I neither approved or disapproved.

Q

So you didn't approve that methodology, did

you,

12

MR.' DAVENPORT:

13

THE WITNESS:

14

I neither approved or

disapproved.

15:03 1 5

MR. MORIARITY:

16

MR. HALES:

17

MR. MORIARITY:

18
19

Asked and answered.

Q

What did you say?

Just yawning.
You yawn with words?

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Now, Mr. Schick would come

to the site only once a month?

15:04 2 0

A

He would come at least once a month.

21

Q

Yes, but would he come more often than that?

22

A

He would occasionally make a visit.

23

Q

How often?

24

A

I don't know.

15:04 2 5

Q

}
Did you wa tch Egbert Construction attem^tr T O ""

•

- r r ;"• O Q

EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
A

No.

Q

Was there anything done with the el ect rical,

or the wr apping of wires, or anything of that nature?
A

No.

Q

You

A

Yes

Q

Had that been done, you would have observed

5

re sure of thatp

it; correct ?
MR. DAVENPORT:

Arei you saying done by Hales &

Warner or someone else?
MR. MORIARITY:
THE WITNESS:

Done by anyone, sir •
I cannot be at all sp<ots of a

j ob site at all times, so items trieay have been

taken

place without me seeing them.
Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Was there a pol<*—

/

tel ephone pole, anywhere on t he p:roj ect?
A

There was a power p ole by my job trail er .

Q

And was that power pole used in any way, shape

or form f or power for this project?
A

Yes

Q

Was there anything done with the power and how

the power was brought to the proj*set or covered up in
any way by anyone that you otjserved after the Smith boy
had been kill*sd, but prior to the time that OSHA had
arrived?

o ub Jo3

EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
10:47

1

A

N O E to my knowledge.

2

Q

Prior to the time that the Smith boy was

3

10:48

10:48

killed, was the framing on schedule?

4

A

No.

5

Q

How far was it behind schedule?

6

A

Probably a couple of weeks, maybe three weeks.

7

Q

Why was it behind schedule?

8

A

That would be based on the work of Egbert

9

Construction.

10
11

Yes, but why was it behind schedule, if you

A

I would say because of their not having done

know?

12

10:48

Q

13

churches before.

14

corrected in their framing, such as heights of walls.

15

We had to tear apart one whole side, back section of a

16

wall, that they had made an inch too tall, and we had to

17

tear that apart and rebuild it.

18

Construction not being able to watch what was going on,

19

I guess.

10:49 20
21
22

I had found problems that had to be

Just Egbert

Q

Why weren't they able to watch what was going

A

Actually, with that situation, with the wall,

on?

23

BRC had actually instructed them to build it that way to

24

save time in cutting studs.

io:49 25

And the plan had called for

the shorter wall, and we had requested that theyUSdflA^w

EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY

the plans
Q

Who is BRC?

A

Brent Reynolds Construction.

Q

What role did they play in this p ro j ect?

A

They were the contracted framers.

Q

Wait a minute.

I thought you sai d E gbert

I Con.struction was doing the framing.
A

Brent Reynolds Construction had verb ally

agreed wi th Egbert Construction to come in and take over
the pro j ect, because Brent Reynolds was una.ble to man
the pro j ect at the time.
Q

How did you find that out?

A

In speaking with Ken Egbert.

Q

How did you first meet Ken Egbert ?

A

The day he came on the job site.

Q

What day was that?

A

That would be the first day that framing

beg an.

He was waiting for and unloading mater ials .

I'm

not sure exactly what date that was.
Q

I want to make sure I'm understanding.
Had you had previous work at all of any nature

whatsoever with BRC?
A

I had called him on the phone to let him know

where the project was on schedule.
Q

Called who?

UU

bJGo

EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY

sir .
A

Can you restate the question, please.

Q

Did you then give Ken Egbert your approval as

to him having Bruce Lemmon become the foreman on the
job?
(Off-the-record
THE WITNESS:

discussion)

That is Ken Egbert's call as to

how he wi 11 run his crew.
Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Did you or did you not

give your approval to Mr. Lemmon becoming the

foreman

for Egbert Construction?
A

That's not for me to do.

Q

So is your answer, No, I did not give my

approval?
MR. DAVENPORT:

1

Q

He's answered the question.

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Please answer.

A

I neither approved or disapproved.

Q

I see .

A

As a superintendent, I work with the crews

that are given me, unless I see a problem.
Q

Given you by whom?

A

By the subcontractors.

Q

Well, who was the subcontractor that gave you

Mr. Lemmon?
A

Ken Egbert.
TTTFT
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
Q

Was there a contract with Mr. Egbert?
MR. DAVENPORT:

It's been asked and answered

many timtes, but you can go ahead and answer that again.
THE WITNESS:

I believe I've answered that.

Q

(BY MR, MORIARITY)

Please answer.

A

There was verbal agreement, as told me by Ken,

between Ken and Brent Reynolds.
Q

Did you trust Mr. Lemmon?

A

I trusted Ken Egbert's qualifications to

select h is own men.
Q

Let me ask you a question.

Did you trust Ken

Egbert's qualifications to select his own men?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, let me ask you a different question.

Did

you trust Bruce Lemmon?
A

As I worked with him, I developed a trust and

an under standing of his knowledge of construction, how
to read plans and work with his men.

!

Q

So is the answer, then, that you trusted him?

A

I developed a trust for him.

Q

Did you find him to be an honest and truthful

person?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Thanks very much.
How often did you deal with Bruce Lemm<g]|/?y J B 4

EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY

them redo?
A

There were several items.

Q

Anything else?

A

Not enough manpower,

Q

Yes.

A

Egbert Construction is a small company, and

Tell me about that.

hires on, as we do, as needed, new employees, and he was
building his crew, but it wasn't coming very fast.
MR. DAVENPORT:

If you know this personally,

that T s fine, but if you're speculating on someone else's
statement to you, you need ~o tell him it's based on
someone else's statement.
THE WITNESS:
Q

I had discussed this with Ken.

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Yes.

And this was the

explanation given to you by Ken Egbert; correct?
A

Yes .

Q

Did he, Ken Egbert, tell you whether or not

his framers were experienced?
A

I did not go into the qualifications of his

employees.
Q

Well, isn't it one of your roles as the

superintendent to make sure chat the work is done in a
workmanlike manner?
A

Could you repeat that, please?

0

Yes.

Isn't it one of your roles as the, r .pQ
^-4

Tab 4

EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
Lumber that has your name on it.
Does that sound accurate?
A

Yes.

Q

I'm going to show you the subcontract

agreement, have you thumb through it, and I'm going to
ask you after you have an opportunity to review it
whether or not this is the subcontract you were
referring to previously and whether or not that's your
signature.
(Off-the-record discussion)
Q

(BY MR. DAVENPORT)

Is this a copy of the

subcontract agreement entered into between Hales &
Warner Construction, Inc. and BRC, Inc.?
A

It looks like it, yes'.

Q

And that's dated May 10, 1999?

A

Yes.

Q

Is that your signature found on page 8?

A

Yes .

Q

You signed it as president of BRC?

A

Yes. . BRC, Inc.

Q

Now, let me ask you a couple of quick general

questions.

As we've gone through all of these

documents, it appears to me that the manner in which
this matter proceeded was that Hales & Warner would
still deal directly with you as their subcontractor and
f 0 x.
U,Uf,U J
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:25

1

you would,

in turn,

2

your sub subcontractor.

3

14:25

deal

w i t h Ken E g b e r t

Construction

Is that a fair statement?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Now, as I understand it, you only sub

6

subcontracted to Ken Egbert part of your subcontract

7

with Hales & Warner; is that correct?

8

you kept the part of purchasing materials and things

9

like that.

In other words,

^ 2 5 10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And the subcontract refers to an amount of

12

$156,000.

13

Warner and BRC; correct?

This is the subcontract between Hales &

14

A

Yes.

14:2615

Q

And I couldn't hear you too well over here,

16

but did you say that your sub subcontract between BRC

17

and Egbert Construction was $72,000?

18

A

I believe that's correct.

19

Q

Okay.

14:26 20
21

as

Now, as I understand it, at the

beginning of this project there was a preconstruction
meeting that you attended; is that correct?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And as I also understand it,- not only were you

24
14:27 25

issued checks as it relates to materials obtained by
you, but you were also issued checks by Hales & War^e"^ (]

EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
A

I gave Hales & Warner a bid to do the framing

on the job.
Q

I want to show you Exhibit 32.
(Exhibit No, 32 is marked for identification.)

Q

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

Can you take a look at

Exhibit 31 for me.
A

This says 32.

Q

That's what I meant, Exhibit 32.

Just

checking to see if you're paying attention.
Could you please take a look at Exhibit 32.
A

Yes.

Q

I s E x h i b i t 32 the b i d you sent t o Hales & •

Warner?
A

Yes.

Q

For the framing?

A

Yes.

Q

And what happened next?

A

They sent me a contract, and I signed it and

sent it back to them.
Q

And then what?

A

I was busy and didn't finish up some other

work that I had going and couldn't get' to this one.
They scheduled it, and so I got Ken Egbert to do the
work.
Q

How exactly did you go about getting Ken..
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
13:20

i

Egbert to do the work?
A

2

3

I called him up and asked him if he'd be

interested in doing this job.

4

Q

Who is Ken Egbert?

5

A

A contractor.

6

Q

Is he an employee of yours?

7

A

No.

8

Q

Is he a friend of yours?

9

A

He's an acquaintance.

13:20 1 0

Q

Is he a business associate?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And what did Mr. Egbert say about doing some

13:20

13

framing for you?

14

A

He said he would be interested in doing it.

13:20 1 5

Q

I was looking at Exhibit 32.

.

16

than framing; am I correct?

17
18
19

13:21 2 0

There's more

A

Yes.

Q

Did you ask Mr. Egbert to help you out with

all aspects of the work described on Exhibit 32 or just
the framing?

21

A

What did you ask Mr. Egbert to do?

Just the framing on it.

I told him I would

22

still supply the material and he could do the framing on

23

it.

24

Q

And what

is

"framing"?

13:21 2 5

A

Putting the frame structure

together., the
0 0 U J 3 '^
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
boards.
Q

The boards?

A

The structure of it.

Q

And the structure -- you've got to understand

I don l t know as much about the construction business as
you do.
A

Build the walls, put the roof on.

Q

That's something I can understand.

You wanted

Mr. Egbert to build the walls?
!

;

A

Yes.

Q

And stand them up?

A

Yes.

P

What about the roof?

A

Do the roof, too.

Q

And you were going to supply him all the wood

and nails that he needed to build these walls?
A

He supplied the nails.

Q

Okay.

And what about the men who were going

to do all of this work?
A

His employees.

Q

What, if any, involvement did you have in the

selection of those men?
A

None .

Q

Did you tell him how many men you needed?

A

I told him he would need 12 to 14 men.- .- r -. <-• ~i
:
_
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:41

1

MR.

DAVENPORT:

2
3

14:41

14:41

That's

all

I

have.

FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. BADARUDDIN:

j

4

Q

Did you ever visit the Highland 4 and 20

5

project site?

6

A

During the framing?

7

Q

At any time.

8

A

I did at the preconstruction meeting.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

And one time when the roof was being done, I

'

11 I sent some new guys down there, and I had to take a
12
13
14
14:42 15
16
17
18

paycheck down to them off of one of my projects.
Q

So other than those two occasions, you never

set foot on the property?
&

I went down and cleaned some material up after

everything was done.
Q

Okay.

So other than those three occasions,

you never set foot on the property?

19

A

No.

14:42 20

Q

Did you act in the capacity of manager or

21

something like that where you would be off site, but

22

somehow involved in the project?

23
24
14:42 25

A

No.
MR. BADARUDDIN:

All right.

don't have any more questions.

Thank you.

I

UUUJOO

EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
Q

Let me break it down.

Did you ever give any

instructions to any Egbert employees as it relates to
this project or how to frame it?
A

No.

Q

Did you ever give any instructions to

Ken

Egbert, himself, as to how he should go about framing
the project or any projections as to employees or safety
concerns or anything like that?
A

No.

Q

Did you, yourself, inspect the site from time

to time?
A

No.

Q

A question was asked in Dean Schick*s

deposition whether or not it would be appropriate to
have a person on the site who didn't have any
experience, and he referred to the fact that everybody
has to start sometime.
Is it appropriate, in your mind, to say, if
you have a crew on the site, which includes experienced
workmen, to hire someone brand new and have them work
alongside experienced workmen in framing such a
building?
A

Yes .

Q

You've indicated that you've done a number of

projects for the LDS Church; is that correct?
-

'

- *- r ~r<?
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:09

X

correct?

2
3

14:09

Q

And you don't have any personal knowledge as

4

to whether Hales & Warner instructed the plaintiff --

5

when I say the plaintiff, I'm referring to the decedent,

6

Jason Smith - - as to how you would go about placing that

7

wall on foundation bolts; is that correct?

14:10 1 0

14:10

Correct

A

That's correct.

Q

It's my understanding you don't have any

personal knowledge as to how, in fact, the accident

11

happened, whether Jason Smith just let go of the wall,

12

tripped over his foot or whatever, you have no personal

13

knowledge whatsoever as to how the accident, in fact,

14

happened; correct?

1 5

A

That's correct.

16

Q

Let me refer you back to Exhibit 37.
Now, according to my notes, as we walk through

17
18

these initial letters, it wasn't until we got to the

19

letter of April 25, 1999, that you indicated that you

14:11 2 0
21

understood that it was around that point in time is when
you sent over some additional workmen; is that correct?

22

A

You said April or August?'

23

Q

August 25.

24

14:12 2 5

Let me restate the question.

We reviewed some initial letters prior to
August 25, 1999 relating to workmen, or at least this

UU0J0 4
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:12

1

one, Exhibit 34.

And then we reviewed the August 25,

2

1999 letter, and I believe it was your testimony that it

3

was after that letter that you'd sent some additional

4

workmen to the site; is that correct?

i*-"" 5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Now, in the August 3, 2000 letter, I want to

7

review a couple of sentences in there and make sure I

8

have it in the right context.

9
i4:i3io
11

In that letter to you of August 25, 1999, it
refers to the fact that if the issue isn't remedied that
they -- let me find the exact language -- I guess

12 J reserve the right to engage additional help; correct?

14:13

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And what I guess I'm getting at is in the

15

first paragraph of your letter, when we refer to that

16

you, meaning Hales & Warner, looked for other framers to

17

do the work but could not find any, was that after this

18

August 25 letter you were referring to?

19
14:13 20

21

14:14

A

No.

It was before the beginning of the

proj ect .

Q

Now, later on in the letter when you refer ..to

22

sending other men,'you're talking about the time period

23

after August 25, 1999; correct?

24

A

Yes.

•. .

25

Q

N o w , as it relates to the second p a r a g r a p h , as
U u U J^o

EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:17

1
2

Q

Okay, what was that?

3

A

When they put sheetrock in the chapel and the

4
14:17

5
6

cultural area so they couldn't frame some door pockets,.
Q

Other than those three, any other ones you

were personally aware of?

7

A

No.

8

Q

So as I understand it, you have no personal

9
14:17

that I knew of.

knowledge of Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing

10

subcontractor or a framing subcontractor's' employees as

11

to the method in which they should raise a wall from the

12 J ground to an upright position; is that correct?

14:18

13

A

That's correct.

14

Q

And you have no personal knowledge whether or

15

not Hales & Warner ever gave any instructions as to any

16

framing subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold

17

a wall that has not yet been tied into place after it's

18

been raised; is that correct?

19

A

Correct.

14:18 20

Q

And you have no personal knowledge as to

21

whether • Hales & Warner ever gave any framing

22

subcontractor instructions as to how to put a wall onto

23

the bolts after it's been raised; is that correct?

24

A

That's correct.

14:19 25

Q

Now, as I've reviewed documents containing the
TT-rrr-r
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
13:36

A

l
2

talked with Ken about.
Q

3
4
13:36

But you don't think that the job was right on

schedule and Mr. Hales was just being unreasonable?

5

A

No.

6

Q

And then' it talks about your construction

7

subcontract, and I don't have any questions about that.
What, if anything, did you do after you

8
9
13:36

All I know is according to this and what I

received this letter?
A

I called Ken Egbert.

11

Q

And told him?

12

A

That he needed more men on the job.

13

Q

Did you do anything else?

14

A

I think about this time I told him I would

1 0

13:36 1 5

16

send some men down off of my crew, and on his payroll,
and he could use them however he saw fit.
Q

17
18

And these men of yours, were they experienced

or inexperienced,'or did it vary?

19

A

They were experienced on churches .

13:37 2 0

Q

And on framing?

21

A

Framing churches.

22

Q

How many men did you send?

23

A

I don't remember.

24
13:37 2 5

I think there was four or

five

Okay.

L e t me a s k you a b o u t what I ' m

ga^ncuto
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
13:43

1

Q

2

It was August 13 of 1999.
Do you know whether you were sending men to

3 . Hales & Warner's Highland 4 and 20 project before and
4
13:43

after August 13 of 1999?

5

A

It was after that.

6

Q

Let me ask you about the second paragraph of

7

Exhibit 37.

8

superintendent interfered with the framing process."

9
13:431 0
11
12
13
14

It says, "From the very beginning, your

Who is the superintendent?
A

I don' t know.

Q

Well, do you remember what he was doing, how

he was interfering with the framing process?
A

Ken called me and told me that they wouldn't

let him frame some of the walls the way he wanted to

13:44 2.5

frame them, told him it wasn't effective framing the way

16

they wanted them framed, and they wouldn't let him frame

17

them in that manner.

18

calling down there and talking to -- I don't remember if

19

I called Cliff Hales or who I 'called.

And I tried to help him out by

13:44 20

Q

Do you know how Egbert wanted to. frame?

21

A

Yes .

22

Q

How did he want to frame?

23

A

Well, the walls we're talking about is -- he

24
13

=44 25

wanted to frame them -- they had a rake on them to
follow the roof joist in one area, and he wanteglyt^joj 5 0

EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
frame them that way, and they didn't want him to until
the roof joists were up so they could make sure the rake
on the wall matched the joist.
MR. DAVENPORT:

Let me ask him, if you don't

mind, did you say "rake"?
THE WITNESS:

Slope on the wall, the rake on

the wall.
Q

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

A

Slope.

Q

Okay.

What is a "rake"?

That's the way Ken Egbert wanted to do

it; correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Kow did the superintendent want him to do it?

A

He wanted him to run the studs along and stand

the wall, and when the joists were up, cut the studs off
and put the top plates on.
Q

Okay.

And how was that difference resolved?

In other words, who won out, Ken Egbert or the
superintendent?
A

The superintendent.

He wanted it done his

way, and I told Ken he had to do it his way if he
couldn't resolve it.
MR. MINNOCK:

"Do it his way," you mean do it

the superintendent's way?
THE WITNESS:

Do it the superintendent's way.

EXAMINATION BY MR.
13:45

2

2

Q

BADARUDDIN

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN*

Well, then the

sentence

continues, referencing, I think, the superintendent
"telling them that they couldn't do it the way they were
used to framing and caused the framer many problems,

13:46

5

costing extra time and material."
Is that what you've told me about or is there

6
7

something else the superintendent was doing?
A

It just cost extra material to frame it that

way, because you can use shorter boards and it costs
13:46 1 0

more time to frame it with —

11

cutting the studs off later.
Q

12
13

16

A

didn't want them to do that.
Q

13:46 2 0

22
23
24
13:47 2 5

And what did the plans or specifications call

for, as far as one inch this way or that?

19

21

They wanted to frame the outside walls an inch

higher and not cut the studs off; the superintendent

17
18

Was there some other aspect of the framing

that the superintendent was interfering with?

14
13 :46 1 5

standing the wall and then

one

A

You have to meet the specified elevations.

Q

Sure.

So Ken Egbert wanted to build it, say,

inch higher than the superintendent; correct?
A

Yes .

Q

What did the plans say?

A

The plans said it was supposed to be one inch

lower than Ken wanted to build it.

^ .. .
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
Q

I've got you.
In the second sentence of the second

paragraph , it says, "This interference continued
throughout the framing of the building."
What did you mean by that?

!

A

•I don't remember right now.

Q

Was there some aspect of framing that the

superintendent didn't interfere with?
A

I don ! t know.

Q

This paragraph seems to say fromL the very

beginning that the superintendent interfered, and then
it goes on, and then it says the interference
through the framing of the building.

continued

The way I

interpreted it is that the superintendent was
interfering from the beginning to the end of your
framing p rocess.
MR. DAVENPORT:

I'm going to obj ect.

asking him to speculate.

You're

As I- understand his prior

testimony , he wasn't even on the job site.
just object to the lack of foundation.

I guess I

He doesn ( t have

any personal knowledge as to what actually- occurred.
MR. BADARUDDIN:

I'm asking him to interpret

his writing, if he's able to do so.
MR. MINNOCK:
question was?

Do you understand what his

He was asking you what you meant by that
•< ..„ •„

r ,

"•
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13:48

1

in terms of the duration the interference lasted.

2

13:48

THE WITNESS:

I don't remember other

3

specifics.

4

told me that they weren't being able to frame like they

5

wanted to, and so I put that in there to try and help

6

Ken out.

7

• Q

Those are the two specifics I remember.

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

And what

I'm

8

really wondering is -- tell me if this is correct.

9

the superintendent interfere with the framing

i 3:48 10

from the very beginning?

11

MR. DAVENPORT:

12

Did

process

Objection; lacks foundation.

He's already testified he wasn't there.

13

MR. MINNOCK:

You can answer.

14

THE WITNESS:

Exterior walls are one of the

13:4915
16
17
18
19

first ones you frame, so that was the beginning of the
proj ect.
Q

21

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

Okay.

Did his

interference ever stop?
A

13=49 20

13:49

Okay.

Ken

I don't know.
MR. DAVENPORT:

Q

Same objection.

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

And then the last

22

sentence of the second paragraph, "If it wasn't wanting

23

something done out of sequence, it was putting other

24

subs and/or material in the way so the framers could not

25

do their job. "

u 0 u u lt H
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
Can you

tell me what you meant by.that

sentence?
A

I know of one instance.

This was after that,

I went down
MR. DAVENPORT:
THE WITNESS:
the building.

Excuse me, after what?
It' was before the completion of

It was during the framing of the roof.

I

had to go down and give -- I sent some other guys down
on the job, and I -- they needed a paycheck from me on
work that they'd done for me, so I took a paycheck down
to them, and they had stacked sheetrock in the way
inside the cultural hall/chapel area of the building.
And that's what I meant by putting material in the way
so that they couldn't complete the project.
Q

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

Was there any other thing

you might have been referring to?
A

That's the only thing I have personal

knowledge of.
Q

Okay.
(Off-the-record discussion)
MR. BADARUDDIN:

Let me ask you about some

other exhibits we've already marked.
look at Exhibit 29.

Let me ask you to

That's the daily from August 4,

1999 .
MR. DAVENPORT:

What is it?

uuuJ 4o
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
one, Exhibit 34.

And then we reviewed the August 25,

1999 letter, and I believe it was your testimony that it
was after that letter that you'd sent some additional
workmen to the site; is that correct?
A

Yes'.

Q

Now, in the August 3, 2000 letter, I want to

review a couple of sentences in there and make sure I
have it in the right context.
In that letter to you of August 25, 1999, it
refers to the fact that if the issue isn't remedied that
they -- let me find the exact language - - I guess
reserve the right to engage additional help; correct?
A

Yes .

Q

And what I guess I'm getting at is in the

first paragraph of your letter, when we refer to that
you, meaning Hales & Warner, looked for other framers to
do the work but could not find any, was.that after this
August 25 letter you were referring to?
A

No.

It was before the beginning of the

project.
Q

Now, later on in the letter when you refer to

sending other men,'you're talking about the time period
after August 25, 1999; correct?
A

Yes .

Q

Now, as i t r e l a t e s to t h e second paragrqjj^jpQ J 4 4
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT

I und erstand it, you referred to an issue rela ting to
!

I th ink they were referred t o as the sheer

these
wall?
A

Yes
We're talking about 3 7?

MR. MINNOCK:
MR. DAVENPORT:
Q

Yes.

(BY MR. DAVENPORT)

Where the £ tuds apparently

1 stuck up past what would be normally the top p late; is
that correct?
A

Yes

Q

Now , the architect referred to that wall as

-

being bui It a t the site location from the> ground up, not
being som ethi ng that was lifted up an d put ont o bolts.
Is that your understanding, or do you have any
knowl edge one way or the other as to .JlOW that particular
wall i was built?
A

I d on't know how they built it .

Q

Can you build it ground up,

SO

to sp eak,

rather th an b uilding it -- well, kind of layin g down and
then lift ing it up?
A

It can be done, yes.

Q

The way in which it was ref erenced as being

built wit h th e studs coming out the top is not an
inapp ropriate way to build it, is it?
A

No.

u0034 3
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
14:15

14:15

1

Q

Could you understand the logic behind building

2

it the way they did, even though you may have felt that

3

another way would have been cheaper in cost?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Now, I think you explained before this

6

sentence where it says, "From the very beginning; your

7

superintendent interfered with the framing process," and

8

I believe you indicated that that was referring to this

9

initial wall that was one inch too high; correct?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Would you agree that there was nothing

12

inappropriate with the superintendent asking Ken Egbert

13

to comply with the plans and build it an inch lower as

14

specified by the plans?

I4-*6 15

A

Correct .

16

Q

Now, as I understand it, the references

14:16

17

relating to this interference relate to those two

18

issues, namely, number one, building the wall as

19

specified by the plans, one inch lower than it had been

20

built, and the other issue was relating to the sheer

21

wall with the studs sticking out the top; correct?

22

A

Are you saying that's the only issues?

23

Q

Those were the two you were referring to as

24
14

far as interference; right?

^ 17 25

A
I

No .

That you had knowledge of?

There was another issue that I kno^. QI>,Q
.
— —
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT
that I knew of.
Q

Okay, what was that?

A

When they put sheetrock in the chapel and the

cultural area so they couldn't frame some door pockets.
Q

Other than those three, any other ones you

were personally aware of?
A

No.

Q

So as I understand it, you have no personal

knowledge of Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing
subcontractor or a framing subcontractor's employees as
to the method in which they should raise a wall from the
ground to an upright position; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And you have no personal knowledge whether or

'not Hales & Warner ever gave any instructions as to any
framing subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold
a wall that has not yet been tied into place after it's
been raised; is that correct?
A

Correct.

Q

And you have no personal knowledge as to

whether • Hales & Warner ever gave any framing
subcontractor instructions as to how to put a wall onto
the bolts after it's been raised; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

u&

Tab 5

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
time of the accident.
Did you witness the accident?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you know how many men were working on that

wall at the time of the accident?
A

No, I, did not .

Q • How did you find out how many men were working
on that wall?
A

Through conversations after the fact.

Q

Okay.

Did you ever at any time know before

that wall was raised how many men were going to raise
it?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you ever give any instructions to the men

that were raising that wall as to how to raise that
wall?
A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you ever give any instructions to anyone

from Brent Reynolds Construction or Egbert Construction
as to how to raise'that wall?
A

No.

Q

Did' you ever give any instructions at any time

to anyone at Brent Reynolds Construction or Egbert
Construction as to how to raise any wall?
A

No.

VTPfT
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FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
12:38 1

12:39

Q

2

Harrier, including Maurice Egbert, to give instructions

3

to Egbert Construction or its enployees or Brent

4

Reynolds Construction or its employees as to how to

5

raise a particular wall?

6

.

A

7

No.

Q

Are you aware of Maurice Egbert or anyone else

8

at Hales 5c Warner .Construction ever giving the Egbert

9

employees who were working on the wall at the time of

12:39io

the accident instructions relating to how to raise that

11

wall?

12

A

13

Q

14

No.
It is my understanding, based on your prior

testimony, you do not have any personal knowledge as to

12:4015

h o w / in fact, the accident actually happened; is that

16

correct? •

17

.

A

That's correct.

18

MR. DAVENPORT:

That's all I have.

19

MR. MORIARITY:

Now there's some, more good

12;

40 20

news or bad news.

What do you want first?

21

THE WITNESS:

22

MR. MORIARITY:

23

THE WITNESS:

24
12:41

Did you ever tell anyone else from Hales &

You have more questions. .
What's that?
Let me assume again.

You have

more questions.

25

MR. MORIARITY:

I

:

Only because

_

of

what

.

thesew

r

\
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Q

Now, the first wall that Ken Egbert

Construction built was too tall, wasn't it?
A

Yes-. •

Q

How did you know that?

A

How did I personally know?

Q

. Yes.

A

Maurice called me.

Q

Where did he call you at?

A" ' On my cell phone.
Q

What did he say?

A

He told me the problem.

Q

This is another problem that the problem

solver would take care of; correct?
A

Jointly, yes .

Q

Jointly with whom?

A

Maurice.
MR. DAVENPORT:

Can we go off the record for a

(Off-the-record

discussion)

minute.

Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Was Maurice Egbert an

officer of Hales & Warner's partnership?
A

It T s a corporation and/'no, he was not.

Q

Was he a director?

A

No.

Q

He was an employee; correct?

TITT/T
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
A

Yes,

Q

Now, when he called you on your cell phone and

told you that Egbert Construction had constructed a wall
that was too tall, what, if anything, did you do about
solving that problem?
A

First of all, I asked him why, what their

thinking was.

Oftentimes, subcontractors come up with

what they think is a better idea.
Q

And what was Maurice's information that he

gave you in response to your inquiry?

him.

A

It was so that they could use precut studs.

Q

So what did you then do?

A

I remember telling Maurice I T d get back to

I mulled it over in my own mind, called him back,

and told him to have them do it the way -- according to
plans and specs.
Q

This was the first wall that Egbert

Construction had constructed; correct?
A

I believe so.

Q

And isn't it true that Maurice told you that

when he had asked Ken Egbert why he was doing it that
way, that Mr. Ken Egbert told Mr. Maurice Egbert that
the reason was because BRC, specifically Mr. Reynolds,
had told him to do it that way; is that correct?
A

That was my understanding.
- r f \ 0 1
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
Hales & Warner Construction?
A

It's signed by Clifford Hales.

Q

May I see it, please?
The date of this permit is May what, 1999?

A
Q

May 17.
' How long did Hales & Warner have to

construct

this Highland project for the LDS Church?
A

I'd have to review the documents.

Q

What documents do you need to review?

A

It should be in the spec book.

It might be

part of the contract.
Q

Exhibit 21, in front of you there, tell me

what that is.
A

Specifications for the Highland building.

Q

Yes.

Now, can you look at that and tell me

how long it was that Hales & Warner had to construct the
Highland church for the LDS Church.
A.

Time of completion, "Time limit for completion

of this work shall be 330 calendar days after time set
forth in written notice to proceed as noted in'the
agreement."
Q

And what page is that?

A

It's invitation to bid, I'm assuming page 1.

Q

.And how many days was it?

.A

330 .

u u uu ob
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
Q

From what?

A

From written notice to proceed.

Q

And when did you receive the written notice to

proceed?
A

I don'i know the date.

Q

Well, what would you have to look at to

determine that?
A
ITd

They send me out a formal notice to proceed;

have to find that.
Q

Well, that's a document that pertains to the

Highland project, setting time limits; isn't that
correct?
A

Yes .

Q

You received it at least prior to the May 17

issuing of the permit as shown in Exhibit 22; isn't that
correct?
A

I don't know that, sir.

Q

You don't?

Well, who sets the time

schedules

for a project on behalf of Hales & Warner?
A

I generally write the schedule.

Q

Where is the schedule for the Highland

project?
A

I'm assuming it's in my office somewhere.

Q

When you prepare this schedule, do you break

it down as to various parts of the project, sir?

UUUJ35
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A

Yes.

Q

Tell me what parts of the project you would

set time limits on, and using as an example this
Highland project.
A

I would set a time limit on forming

and

pouring footings, a time limit to excavate for the
footings, a time limit to form and pour the foundation,
time to prepare the slab, a time limit to pour the slab.
Basically, every portion of that work has a time affixed
to it.
Q

Why?

A

It's a matter of coordination between subs.

Q

Why is that important?

A

It keeps everyone informed.

expect up front.
Q

They know what: to

It makes jobs go smoother.

When you say it lets everyone know what to

expect up front, what do you mean?
A

It means that we send out a schedule, either

with their contract or shortly after.

They can review

it and plan for those time schedules.
Q

For example, Exhibit 14, what is that?

A

It's a subcontract from Hales & Warner

Construction to BRC, Incorporated.
Q

Is the schedule attached to it?

A

No, sir.
_

.

—
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FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
contractor

entering

a

contract

with

a subcontractor,

is

there?
A

No.

Q

And, in fact, there's a whole separate section

in here on subcontractors, and I believe your prior
testimony was it was obviously contemplated that Hales &
Warner would use subcontractors and that they, in turn,
could use sub subcontractors; is that your
understanding?
A

Yes.

Q

And you didn't have a problem with that?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

And so there's nothing out of the

ordinary of maybe a subcontractor either engaging
someone just to help them out, or even to do most of the
work on their behalf, is there?
A

Right.

Q

Okay.

In the contract, it also refers to,

"And the architect shall be the owner's representative
during the construction period, and shall have the
authority to act on behalf of the owner, to the extent
provided in the contract document."
That was the role being filled by Butler &
Evans; correct?
U U b U ?'
A

Yes.

EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
13:30

13:31

1

working on any part of the Highland 4 and 20 project,

2

because whatever it was they might be doing or the

3

subcontractors were doing didn't meet your standards?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Did you inspect the Highland 4 and 20 project

6

at any time after the work began?

7
8
9
13:31 io

When I say "work," I mean construction.
A

Let's put it this way; I observed.

I don't

inspect.
Q

Okay.

What exactly did you do?

You drove out

11

there; right?

12

A

We would hold monthly meetings.

13

Q

Where?

14

A

On the site.

-3i is

Q

Where?

16

A

In the construction trailer.

17

Q

In a trailer?

18

A

We would review the schedule, mostly payment

13

19
13:3120

And what did those entail?

requests, any subcontractor problems or change orders,
things of that nature.

21

Q

And what else, if anything, did you do?

22

A

We would go out and look at the work that had

23

been done.

24

Q

You would walk around the site?

13:31 25

A

Yes .

uuuJ2o
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Q

And look at the work that had been done?

Inspect i t?

What exactly did you do?

A

We'd look at it, observe it.

Q

And would you compare it to your plans or

1 designs?
A

Yes .

Q

For what purpose?

A

Make sure it was installed correctly.

Q

In the Highland 4 and 20 project, was anything

i.istalled

incorrectly?

A

No.

Q

Were all the components as you specified in

your desi gns or otherwise?
A

When you say "all," you know, we're all human.

I couldn' t have caught everything, but to my knowledge,
yes .
Q

Do you recall whether or not you made any

change or ders?
A

Yes .

Q

Did you make any change orders?

A

I always do.

Q

What sort of change orders did you make?

A

I don't remember right offhand.

I have yet to build one that we

don't.

look back. on that project.

I'd have to

It's been too long ago to ^-'
U U If J u, 0 '
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FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN
on the phone?
A

No .

Q

What?

A

Just tell the contractor, I'm not going to

accept that subcontractor.
Q

And that would just be oral?

A

Yes.

Q

Hales & Warner could not substitute a

subcontractor that had been accepted by the LDS Church;
correct?
MR. DAVENPORT:

Objection; asked and answered.

Go ahead.
THE WITNESS:
you're after.
Q

I'm trying to figure out what

I guess --

(BY MR. BADARUDDIN)

Let me direct you to

5 . 1 D.
It says "the contractor."

That would be

Hales & Warner.

did.

A

That's correct.

Q

Shall not

A

Usually that's in writing.

Q

What is in writing?

A

Substitution of a contractor.

Q

So he will give you the list of subs, which he

And by not objecting, you're accepting them? >olibJ^|4
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14:32

1
2

A

Q

14:33

You get a list of subcontractors.

4

reject

5

the p r o j e c t ,

6

s c h e d u l e , y o u could then reject

7

14:32

Or if they could not comply w i t h the

s c h e d u l e , the subcontractor.

3

14:32

Yes.

them straightaway or wait

A

and if they're

Well, the general contractor would then say,

with so and s o .
Okay.

Are you

substituted

12

they were g o i n g to do so?

any subcontractors

unless n o t i f y i n g

13-

A

Right.

14

Q

What does it mean to substitute a

A

Put somebody else in their place, another

subcontractor.

18

(Off-the-record

19

M R . BADARUDDIN:
of q u e s t i o n s .

discussion)
That

concludes my s e c o n d set

I don't know if anyone else has any.

21

M R . TOLK:

22

We'll reserve the right

I have n o n e .

23

review

24

we'll get that to him.

25

y o u that

subcontractor?

16

i4-.33'20

okay

So Hales & Warner, should not have

11

17

time

them?

9

15

into

just not meeting t h e i r

We need to find another subcontractor.

Q

could

for them to g e t

8

10

You

the t r a n s c r i p t .

to have Mr. S c h i c k

Send that to our o f f i c e and

" (Exhibit N o . 24 is m a r k e d
i
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FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY
A

No.

Q

You weren't at the scene of the accident on

the day of uhe accident?
A

No.

Q

You personally didn't ever instruct any Egbert

employee to place the subject wall on the bolts in a
certain method or by way of a certain operative detail,
did you?
A

No.

Q

Does the LDS Church provide you with an

overall time frame under which rhey want a project
completed?
A

Yes .
MR. DAVENPORT:

That's all the questions I

have.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. MORIARITY:
Q

What time frame did the LDS Church give you on

this project?
A

I'd have to look for sure.

Q

Where would that be?

A

It might be in that manual.

It's probably

nine months, but it could have been 11 months at that
time .
Q

You believe it's in the manual?

VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR

iJUUJ

67

)o

Tab 7

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT
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that, that Hales and Warner cited over and over, the injury
causing aspect, or Section 414, then I don't think our, under
our facts we can meet that standard.

But I believe that we

meet, what we're arguing is a broader standard as articulated
in paragraphs 18 and 19 that all they have to do is
participate in the work.
THE JUDGE:
argument.

All right.

I understand your

Let me just ask you then, for purposes of my

understanding that the framework of your argument, you're not
really, as perhaps you did earlier, arguing that there are
factual disputes?

You know, we really as far as a summary

judgment goes are we really, I mean, it's an A and B thing so
we have disputed facts, if there are none then we're talking
pure law.

Is that where you are?
MR. BADARUDDIN:

I think that's where we are.

But from reading the Hales and Warner's reply memorandum
they've accused us of taking unfair liberties with the
facts.

And we're entitled to a, we're entitled to any

reasonable inference from any testimony or fact or evidence.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

MR. BADARUDDIN:

So I don't think we're really

arguing about the facts, I m e a n —
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

I mean as, as I looked at the

various references to the depositions and, and a, things, it
looked to me like maybe the only real factual issue was the
SMITH VS. HALES & WARNER, et al
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1

whether or not there had been some control exerted by Hales

2

and Warner over the height of the one wall, the one inch

3

difference, and then there was the, how they were going to

4

build the wall that was supposed to be raked to meet the

5

trusses.

6

MR. BADARUDDIN:

7

THE JUDGE:

8
9

Right.

And then maybe there was one other

thing.
MR. BADARUDDIN:

No.

Well, Brent Reynolds in his

10

deposition made general references to interference and he

11

used layman's—

12

THE JUDGE:

Right.

13

MR. BADARUDDIN:

14

THE JUDGE:

And then those letters.

Right.

And there was the issue there of

15

whether he was just relying on hearsay, and I thought that

16

became pretty clear he was relaying complaints he'd heard

17

from Brent Reynolds, wasn't really telling things that he

18

knew about, but that was Brent Reynolds' complaint.

19

the end it seemed like in Brent Reynolds' deposition it

20

turned into pretty minor stuff.

21

MR. BADARUDDIN:

And in

Well, no one really, none of

22

the witnesses really did well on cross.

You could kind of

23

get them to admit whatever you wanted.

But to the extent

24

that that happened, this being summary judgment and us being

25

the nonmovant, we go with the evidence that's favorable to
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1

all in context and then I'll retake the bench.

2

MR. GOOCH:

Okay.

3

MR. DAVENPORT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

4

(Tape turned off.)

5

COURT'S RULING
THE JUDGE:

6
7

record.

We're back on the

It looks like everyone is here.
First of all, I'd like to thank all the counsel for

8
9

All right.

their memos, their briefing and the attachments.

As we all

10

admitted it took a great deal of time to get through it all.

11

And it was spread all over my kitchen table last night until

12

about midnight where I do any finest work.
The...

13

I think all the parties have been well

14

represented and a, I think we have effectively today narrowed

15

the issues for my consideration.

16

this is what I asked plaintiff's counsel very carefully about

17

it, I think factually there is not any dispute here at all.

18

I think what it's all coming down to is an interpretation of

19

Thompson v. Jess.

And I think factually, and

I'm going to outline some facts and I will ask the

20
21

prevailing party to fill in those facts that may put it in

22

better perspective, but as I indicated I don't think that we

23

have any great facts in dispute.

24

the dates at the top of my head so I'd ask you to put in the

25

dates.

The a...

And I don't have

SMITH VS. HALES & WARNER, et al
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Those are page three, four, six and seven of our original
memorandum that talk about the responsibilities of others who
inspected the property.
Thank you.
MR. BADARUDDIN:

By process of elimination if must

be my turn.
THE JUDGE:

It must be.

- ARGUMENT BY MR. BADARUDDIN
MR. BADARUDDIN:

I'm not going to spend a lot of

time with the facts, Judge, because they're, the facts on
which we rely are kind of listed in a serial fashion in our
memorandums.

But I just wanted to remind the Court that

basically the, the operative facts I think that are involved
is Jason Smith, Jose Luis and Michael Lewis were, were
lifting a wall onto some bolts and in the course of doing so
the well fell on Jason and Jason was killed.
Now if their, if Hales and Warner, if
Mr. Davenport's quotation of a, Thompson versus Jess that,
that Hales and Warner has to be involved in, in maybe telling
Jason lift that wall onto those bolts, if that's what
Thompson versus Jess requires, then we lose.

He's, he's

quoted Thompson versus Jess in this handout and extensively,
extensively in his brief, and basically he makes frequent
reference to, Hales and Warner and makes frequent reference
to the injury causing aspect of the work.

SMITH VS. HALES & WARNER, et al
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We've quoted Thompson versus Jess extensively in

1
2

our brief and we a, frequently refer to basically what, what

3

the plaintiff says is the principal employer is

4

actively participates in the work or project, basically

5

leaving out that operative, reference to operative detail or

6

injury causing aspect.
So what is it that Thompson says?

7

liable if he

Well, first

8

thing Thompson does is they quote from Section 415 of the

9

Second Restatement of Torts.

Which by the way is the,

10

that's, that's where Hales and Warner's quote came from,

11

injury causing aspect, that's comment B, excuse me, comment C

12

to section 414 of the Restatement.

13

Utah after it quotes section 14 says this doctrine i s —
THE JUDGE:

14
15

And the Supreme Court of

Will you give me the paragraph so I

can follow?
MR. BADARUDDIN:

16

Yes ma'am, Your Honor.

Hales

17

and Warner is quoting from paragraph 21 if you have the Lexis

18

version of this case.

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. BADARUDDIN:

21

That's my most marked up version.

327, or paragraph 21.

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. BADARUDDIN:

24
25

And it's at paragraph 979 P.2d at

I've got paragraph 21.
Okay.

Although the requisite

level?
THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

SMITH VS. HALES & WARNER, et al
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1

these two defendants.
Now as to the issues of breach, having found that

2
3

there is no duty I don't know that I have to address breach,

4

do I?
MR. DAVENPORT:

5

Well, we prefer you do just

6

because in case of an appeal.

7

pretty clear, but I think we prevail on those two issues

8

too.

9
10
11

MR. BADARUDDIN:
before the Court.

I don't know, I think it's

We would just argue that it's not

But breach of what if there's no duty?

THE JUDGE:

Well, I think the way that I've

12

approached it where I found that there's actually been no

13

duty it leaves me having to say hypothetically if there had

14

been a duty then I don't have any facts to support a breach.

15

And I just didn't feel from what I had read that that was

16

briefed in a manner that I could really make an ultimate

17

decision on it.

18

that there's no duty of care on the part of these two

19

defendants and leave it at that.

20
21
22

And so I'll hang my hat on, on the finding

Is there anything else I need to cover?

you... Well, I suspect you both want to write your own.
MR. DAVENPORT:

23

to Rob if that's okay.

24

inaudible, no mic).

25

Which of

THE JUDGE:

I'll prepare it and circulate it
And we'll, and then we'll (short

Okay.

Are there any legal theories

SMITH VS. HALES & WARNER, et al
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THE JUDGE:

Really?

MR. DAVENPORT:

Yes.

I think he understands that

a control, being controlled by someone.

I think he can

understand that it was Egbert Construction personnel that was
controlling his action at the time.

They're the ones that

told him what to do, versus a Hales and Warner employee
telling him what to do.

I think a construction worker can

understand what affirmative means as it relates to that
control.
But let me just make one other point.
does go to facts.

I think it

But, even if you were to strike out that

fact we still have the affidavit of Michael Lewis saying that
I was told to do this by Egbert Construction personnel.
They instructed me to go put that wall into place.

There is

no evidence here that Hales and Warner told them how to put
that wall into place.

There is evidence here before the

Court that Egbert Construction told them to put the wall into
place.
Now, I'd say as it relates to the other affidavits
submitted we are not here to the extent it has a, a statement
at the end saying it's my opinion that Hales and Warner were
not at fault.

We're not relying en that type of language.

Or to the extent it says based upon discussions with other
people it's my understanding that they don't know of
anybody.

We're not relying on those hearsay statements.
NOVEMBER 19, 2002
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defendant Hales and Warner, wasn't in the vicinity of the
accident, didn't see how it happened.

And I don't see how

those facts will help this Court determine that not one or
more of the defendants did not exercise affirmative control
over the manner, method and means of the injury causing
aspect of the work.

And those are terms I'm sure we're

going to get into with the a, summary judgment motion.
With regard to Thomas and the, the alleged hearsay
statements that were introduced and that the Utah, I think
it's the Supreme Court considered, those witnesses were
deposed, they were asked questions about well how do you know
that and who, who exactly told you to do such and such.
haven't that opportunity.

We

And the attorney planning,

planning meeting order gives us until January 31 to do fact
discovery and June to do, complete discovery and we haven't,
straying into our 56(f) motion, we haven't had an opportunity
to do what the plaintiffs got to do in Thomas.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Well, at this point let me

make a decision at least as to these two affidavits.

I

would like to look at the case law on the other.
The affidavit of Michael Lewis, and this is the
first one that was submitted, by stipulation of the parties
and also by my finding that it's hearsay, I will strike the
second sentence of paragraph four that reads:
"It is my understanding from
NOVEMBER 19, 2002
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1

then June 30 for everything else.

Why would the order do

2

that if that, if that amount of time was more than adequate,

3

more than sufficient.

4

the parties have agreed is sufficient, and we should have

5

what the parties agree is sufficient.

I submit that the order sets out what

The Downtown Athletic Club case, Downtown Athletic

6
7

Club versus Harmon the court, a court shouldn't grant summary

8

judgment if discovery is incomplete.

9

incomplete.
THE JUDGE:

10

Our discovery is

Tell me exactly what you think

1 1 you're going to find in your discovery, or that you should
12

find in your discovery that's going to get you past the case

13

law.

1.4

MR. BADARUDDIN:

Well, the case law doesn't say

15

you can't sue a general, well, it doesn't say you can't

16

recover against a general contractor or an owner.

17

THE JUDGE:

Right.

18

MR. BADARUDDIN:

It says if the general contractor

19

actively participates or exercises control over the means,

20

method, manner of accident causing injury, accident causing

21

work, the plaintiff can recover.

22

of facts we hope to establish.

23

with the contract itself which we've objected to.

24

provides the defendant CPB a variety of rights that are

25

inconsistent with its, its insulation from liability.

Those, those are the sort
We, I guess we get our start
But it

NOVEMBER 19, 2002
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant workman, an employee of an independent
contractor, sought review of an order of the Eighth District, Duchesne County (Utah),
granting summary judgment to appellee motel owner in appellant's action for damages
sustained while appellant worked on the property.
OVERVIEW: Appellee motel owner asked that a pipe be delivered to her motel property.
When appellant workman, an employee of an independent contractor, arrived, appellee
asked him to install the pipe. Appellant said that he did not have the preferred tools, but
agreed to attempt installation. The pipe fell during installation and caused appellant's leg
to be amputated. Appellant sued, claming that appellee was negligent in her control of
the situation and in failing to take special precautions. The trial court granted appellee's
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed. Appellee had no duty
under the "retained control" doctrine because she did not actively participate in the
performance of the work; she did not impose means or methods of achieving the work,
but merely stated her desired result: the pipe's installation. The "peculiar risk" and
"inherently dangerous work" doctrines did not provide theories of relief for appellant, as
they only applied to innocent third parties injured as a result of the independent
contractor's negligence.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment; appellee was not liable
under the "retained control" doctrine because she did not actively participate in the
and the "peculiar risk" and "inherently dangerous work" doctrines were inapplicable to
appellant, as he was an employee of the independent contractor.
CORE TERMS: pipe, contractor, independent contractor, retained control, precautions,
install, workers' compensation, physical harm, inherently dangerous, duty of care, plywood,
backhoe, stub, contracted, peculiar risk, subject to liability, subcontractor, hired, owed, duty,
motel, performing, summary judgment, third parties, installed, chain, general contractor,

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?__m=6dl5580c542a2df3f9ed00816026b8db&csvc=le<5..

5/19/04

Get a Document - by Citation - 1999 UT 22

Page 2 of 14

beams, hires, agreeing
LexisNexis ( T M ) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts - • Hide Concepts
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard*3
Hm

± S u m m a r y judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
l9W.

More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >De Novo Review
MIV2

±The appellate court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, according no deference to the court's legal
conclusions.

More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors 'm
H/v3

± U t a h adheres to the general common law rule that the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of
the contractor or his servants. This general rule recognizes that one who hires an
independent contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which
the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of
the manner or method of performance implemented. The most commonly accepted
reason for this rule is that, where the principal employer does not control the
means of accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor is the proper party to
be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk arising out of the work,
and administering and distributing it. More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors lm
HN4

±Jhe
retained control doctrine is a narrow theory of liability applicable in the unique
circumstance where an employer of an independent contractor exercises enough
control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care, but not
enough to become an employer or a master of those over whom the control is
asserted. The duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under the
circumstances and is confined in scope to the control asserted. More Like This Headnote

Labor &. Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors
HNS

&Under the retained control doctrine, one who entrusts work to an independent
contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability
for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise
reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with
reasonable care.

More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors %S
HN6

&A

principal employer is not subject to liability for injuries arising out of its
contractor's work unless the employer actively participates in the performance of
the w o r k .

More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors "*M

HN7&under the "active participation" standard, a principal employer is subject to liability
for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is
actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance of the
contracted work. Such an assertion of control occurs, for example, when the
principal employer directs that the contracted work be done by use of a certain
mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to
be accomplished. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the
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work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to
prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to
employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods
Of w o r k , o r as t o o p e r a t i v e d e t a i l .

More Like This Headnote

Labor 8c Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors l «3
wws

± T o have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal employer must
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work.
The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty must involve either
the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury. Although
the requisite level of control over the contractor's manner or method of work does
not rise to the level of creating a master-servant relationship, the principal
employer must exert such control over the means utilized that the contractor
cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way. A
typical instance in which such an exertion of control might occur is when a principal
contractor entrusts a part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a
foreman superintends the entire job. More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors "m
W¥9

± U n d e r Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 413 (1965), one who employs an
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to
create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer fails to provide in the
contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or fails to exercise
reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such
precautions.

More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors v«d

HNIO^Under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965), one who employs an
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely
to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless
special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the
contract or Otherwise.

More Like This Headnote

Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors

HN1J&Under Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 427 (1965), one who employs an
independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's
failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger. More Like This Headnote
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors
H/Vi2

Q

± T h e purpose of the "peculiar risk" doctrine and the "inherently dangerous work"
doctrine, under Restatement (Second) of Torts §5 413, 416, and 427 (1965), is to
ensure that innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an independent
contractor hired by a landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land
would not have to depend on the contractor's solvency in order to receive
compensation for the injuries. This purpose is not advanced when these
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exceptions are applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are covered by
workers' compensation. Thus, the doctrines have no application when the injured
person is an employee of the independent contractor undertaking the allegedly
dangerous work.

More Like This Headnote

COUNSEL: John Paul Kennedy, Salt Lake City, and David J. Bennion, San Jose, Cal., for
plaintiff.
Stephen G. Morgan, Joseph E. Minnock, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
JUDGES: RUSSON, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's opinion.

OPINIONBY: RUSSON
OPINION:
[**323]

RUSSON, Justice:

[ * P 1 ] Trevor Thompson appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Connie Jess, owner of four motels in Duchesne, Utah. The district court ruled, as a
matter of law, that Thompson could not recover from Jess for injuries sustained while
erecting a steel pipe for use as a sign post at one of Jess's motels. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
[ * P 2 ] On or about March 9, 1995, Jess phoned AmeriKan Sanitation to arrange for the
purchase and delivery of a used steel pipe. Jess requested a hollow pipe approximately 20
feet in length with an 8-inch diameter, one that would fit vertically over an [ * * 3 2 4 ]
existing pipe stub secured to the ground in front of one of her motels, [ * * * 2 ] which stub
would support the larger pipe for use as a sign post. After agreeing upon a price, Jess
requested that the pipe be delivered to her motel.
Two employees of AmeriKan Sanitation, Dennis Jensen and Trevor Thompson, delivered the
pipe. When Jensen inquired where to place the pipe, Jess told him she wanted it installed
over the existing pipe stub. Jensen responded that he had been instructed only to deliver the
pipe and that he was not equipped to erect it in the best manner. Jess then asked Jensen if
he would install the pipe, and he agreed to do so, believing he could improvise by hoisting
the pipe with the winch truck and tools he had with him.
[ * P 4 ] At that point, Jess's involvement in erecting the pipe ceased, and she went inside the
motel. Jensen, who had hoisted similar pipes more than a hundred times before, determined
on his own the manner and method of lifting and installing the pipe. For leverage, Jensen set
up stabilizing poles in an A-frame formation. He then attached to the pipe a "system-seven"
chain and a hook using a "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch"--a method of fastening pipe,
which Jensen had used many times prior, whereby the weight of the pipe [ * * * 3 ] pulls the
chain tight. Jensen connected the chain to a winch cable that was strung over the A-frame
and proceeded to hoist the pipe with the winch attached to his truck. Thompson stood near
the back of the truck and attempted to guide the elevated pipe onto the pipe stub protruding
from the ground.
[ * P 5 ] After lifting the pipe as high as this method would allow, Jensen and Thompson
discovered they were approximately two inches short of being able to raise the pipe over the
top of the pipe stub. They decided to lower the pipe to the ground and obtain different
equipment that would lift the pipe the requisite height. In the process of lowering the pipe,
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however, slack developed in the chain, and the pipe slipped out, bouncing on the ground and
striking Thompson in the leg. As a result of the injuries sustained from this incident,
Thompson's leg was amputated below the knee, n l
Footnotes

n l Shortly after the accident, Thompson applied for and began receiving workers'
compensation benefits through his employer, Amerikan Sanitation.

End Footnotes

[***4]

[ * P 6 ] The day following the accident, Jensen returned to the site with a backhoe and
erected the pipe without problem using the same chain-hitch method. Both Jensen and
Thompson, as well as their employer, AmeriKan Sanitation, testified after the accident that
had they known in advance they would be asked to raise and install the pipe, they would
have arrived prepared with a backhoe or crane in the first instance. However, after agreeing
to install the pipe for Jess, neither Jensen nor Thompson informed her that a backhoe or
crane was necessary to do the job. Rather, as reflected by the record, Jensen simply told
Jess that although he lacked the best equipment, he would nonetheless erect the pipe.
Jensen devised his own technique for the task, and Thompson helped him in the attempt.
[ * P 7 ] In April 1997, Thompson filed suit against Jess, alleging that she was negligent in
the control she exercised over installation of the pipe and in failing to take or require special
precautions in the performance of the job. After the parties conducted discovery, Jess moved
for summary judgment, arguing that (1) she did not direct or otherwise control the manner
or method of installing the pipe, and therefore [ * * * 5 ] owed no duty of care to Thompson or
Jensen to insure they raised the pipe safely, and (2) she cannot be held vicariously liable for
the negligent acts of the independent contractor she hired, regardless of whether the work
involved peculiar risks or was inherently dangerous, because the injuries were suffered by an
employee of that independent contractor. The district court granted Jess's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that under Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 284-85, 148 P. 408, 411
(1914), Jess owed Thompson no duty of protection or warning concerning performance of the
task because she did not exercise control over the manner or method utilized to install the
pipe.
[ * P 8 ] On appeal, Thompson contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment. Thompson argues that by requesting [ * * 3 2 5 ] that he and Jensen erect the pipe
when they were not obligated to do so, and by directing them to install the pipe over the
existing pipe stub, Jess asserted control over the work and thereby assumed a duty of care
to him under the "retained control" doctrine set forth in section 414 of the Restatement. n2
Thompson also submits that, under section 413 of the Restatement, the work Jess [ * * * 6 ]
requested posed "a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others" and that,
consequently, Jess had a duty to take appropriate safety precautions. By not taking
measures to ensure the safety of the work, asserts Thompson, Jess breached her duties of
care under these provisions. Thompson argues that Jess knew or should have known from
erecting sign posts at her other motels that a crane or backhoe was required to install the
pole safely.
-

Footnotes

n2 All Restatement references herein are to Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
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End Footnotes

[ * P 9 ] As an alternative theory of liability, Thompson posits that even if Jess was not
directly negligent herself, she nonetheless should be held vicariously liable for the
contractor's negligence—in this case, the negligence of Thompson's co-worker, Jensen—
because Jess knew the work she requested involved a peculiar risk of physical harm to
others. On this point, Thompson urges this court to adopt and apply in his favor sections 416
and 427 of the Restatement. Section 416 imposes vicarious [ * * * 7 ] liability on the principal
employer for the contractor's negligence if the employer knows or should know that the work
involves "a peculiar risk of physical harm to others." Section 427 imposes the same liability
for work involving "a special danger to others . . . inherent in or normal to the work."
[ * P 1 0 ] In response, Jess counters that the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment because (1) she did not control the manner or method in which Thompson and
Jensen attempted to lift and install the pole, and therefore owed them no duty of care under
the "retained control" doctrine; and (2) sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement
provide causes of action to "others"—meaning innocent third parties—not to employees of the
independent contractor hired to perform the allegedly dangerous work.
[ * P 1 1 ] Thus, the principal issues before us are (1) whether Jess owed Thompson a duty of
care under the "retained control" doctrine, and (2) whether the "peculiar risk" and "inherently
dangerous work" doctrines under sections 413, 426, and 427 of the Restatement provide
causes of action in favor of employees of the contractor hired to perform the work at issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[ * P 1 2 ] HN11F [ * * * 8 ] Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Doit, Inc.
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). H / V 2 TWe review the district court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the court's legal
conclusions. See id.
ANALYSIS
HNsqp [ * p i 3 ] utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or
omission of the contractor or his servants." Restatement § 409; see Gleason v. Salt Lake
City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting applicability of said general rule and
certain exceptions to it). This general rule recognizes that one who hires an independent
contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of
performance implemented. See W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed.
1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the principal
employer does not control the means of accomplishing [ * * * 9 ] the contracted work, the
contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk
[arising out of the w o r k ] , and administering and distributing it." I d .
[ * P 1 4 ] In the case at bar, Thompson does not contend that by agreeing to install the pipe
over the existing pipe stub, he and Jensen [ * * 3 2 6 ] became Jess's employees. Rather,
Thompson relies entirely on certain exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an
employer of an independent contractor: namely, the "retained control" doctrine, and the
"peculiar risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrine. We address each in turn.
A. "Retained Control" Doctrine

http://www.lexisxom/research/retrieve?_m=6dl5580c542a2df3f9ed00816026b8db&csvc=le&.

5/19/04

Get a Document - by Citation -1999 UT 22

Page 7 of 14

[ * P 1 5 ] Thompson charges that Jess should be subject to liability because, by requesting
that the pipe be erected and instructing that it be installed over the existing pipe stub, she
controlled and directed the work that caused his injuries. HN4Tln so arguing, Thompson
on the retained control doctrine, which, as set forth more fully below, is a narrow theory of
liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer of an independent
contractor exercises enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of
care, [ * * * 1 0 ] but not enough to become an employer or a master of those over whom the
control is asserted. The duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under the
circumstances and is confined in scope to the control asserted.

[*P16]
In 1965, the American Law Institute promulgated the retained control doctrine as section 414
of the Restatement, which states:
§ 414. Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part
of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer
owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control
with reasonable care.
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 414 (1965). This doctrine has not been adopted formally in
Utah, although similar principles were discussed in this court's early decision of Dayton v.
Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 411-12 (Utah 1914).
[ * P 1 7 ] In Dayton, this court addressed whether a company that employed an independent
contractor was liable for injuries sustained by an employee of that contractor during the
blasting of an underground tunnel. See [ * * * n ] 148 P. at 411-12. Citing a number of
authorities from other states, the injured employee claimed that because the company, by
contract, reserved to itself certain rights pertaining to overall management of the contract
work, "the relation between the company and the contractors was not that of independent,
but nonindependent, contractors." 148 P. at 4 1 1 . As a result, argued the injured employee,
he should be allowed to recover against the company. The court disagreed, stating:
[The cited authorities] relate to instances and cases where the proprietor or employer
reserved or exercised the right to superintend, direct or control the work, not only with
respect to results, but also with reference to methods of procedure or means by which the
result was to be accomplished, where the will and discretion of the contractor as to the time
and manner of doing the work or the means and methods of accomplishing the results were
subordinate and subject to that of the owner or proprietor. We do not find anything in the
contract or the evidence [identified by the plaintiff] which brings this case within such a rule.
I d . The court concluded that the injury had been caused by the manner [ * * * 1 2 ] in which
the work was performed rather than by the nature of the work itself. See 148 P. at 412.
Because the company exercised no control over the contractor's manner of work, it owed the
plaintiff no duty to warn or guard him "against dangers incident to or created by the
prosecution of the work, and certainly not to guard or protect him against the negligence of
those who had employed him or with whom he labored." I d .
[ * P 1 8 ] This court has not had opportunity to determine the precedential value of Dayton
with respect to the retained control doctrine. Several federal courts applying Utah law,
however, have been called upon to do so. H/V6 ?Yhose courts uniformly have determined that
under Dayton, a principal employer is not subject to liability for injuries arising out of its
contractor's work unless the employer "actively participates" in the performance of the work.
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For instance, in Simon v. Deery Oil, 699 F. Supp, 257, 258 [ * * 3 2 7 ] (D. Utah 1988), the
court cited Dayton for the proposition that a principal employer "retaining an independent
contractor to render services has no duty to warn or train employees of the contractor, nor
must the principal protect the contractor's [ * * * 1 3 ] employees from the contractor's own
negligence, unless the principal has 'actively participated' in the project." See also Sewell v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274, 276 (10th Cir, 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1080, 62
L. Ed. 2d 763, 100 S. Ct. 1031 (1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir.
1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6685, * 8
(addressing Utah law on issue). We believe the standard relied upon in these cases is correct,
and we formally adopt the same. Elaboration on the contours of the standard is needed,
however.
«/v/3jp [ * p i 9 ] under the "active participation" standard, a principal employer is subject to
liability for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. See
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973) (holding that under "active participation"
standard, principal employer must directly influence manner in which work is performed; no
duty arises from "passive nonparticipation"). Such an assertion of control occurs, for
example, when the principal employer directs that [ * * * 1 4 ] the contracted work be done by
use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the work
is to be accomplished. See, e.g., Lewis v. N.J, Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825
P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing liability where subcontractor's employee was injured as
result of new, less safe method of work required by general contractor); Redinger v. Living,
Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985) (imposing liability where subcontractor was ordered
to operate backhoe dangerously close to plaintiff).
[ * P 2 0 ] The comments to section 414 of the Restatement provide guidance as to the
"active participation" requirement:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least
some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. I t is not enough that he
has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or
to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be
followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved
to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled [ * * * 1 5 ] as to his
methods of work, or as to operative detail.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965) (emphasis added). HNff¥ln other words,
to have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal employer must have
exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work. See Grahn v.
Tosco Corp., 58 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 897, * 3 7 - 3 8 , rev. denied, 1998
Cal. LEXIS 494. "The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty must involve
either the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury." I d .
[ * P 2 1 ] Although the requisite level of control over the contractor's manner or method of
work does not rise to the level of creating a master-servant relationship, cf. Restatement §
414 cmt. a, the principal employer must exert such control over the means utilized that the
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way. Cf.
id. cmt. c. A typical instance in which such an exertion of control might occur is "when a
principal contractor entrusts a part of the [ * * * 1 6 ] work to subcontractors, but himself or
through a foreman superintends the entire job." I d . cmt. b.
[ * P 2 2 ] The requisite level of control over the contractor's work is well illustrated in Lewis,
825 P.2d at 7-8. There, the general contractor, Riebe, hired the subcontractor, Garges, to
install a pitched roof constructed of beams and sheets of plywood nailed to the beams. After
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Garges had already put the plywood in place, Riebe's on-site superintendent told Garges the
roof was improperly installed and ordered it redone, specifying the use of H -clips to secure
the plywood. Pursuant to this [ * * 3 2 8 ] instruction, Garges employees began removing the
nails from each row of plywood, installing H-clips, and then renailing the plywood to the
beams. Soon thereafter, however, Riebe's superintendent instructed the Garges employees
to use a different, faster method of dislodging the plywood by banging it from underneath.
Because this method resulted in plywood being dislodged faster than H-clips could be
installed, numerous sheets of plywood were left lying loose on top of the beams. A Garges
employee stepped on the loose plywood and fell through the roof, incurring serious injuries.
See id.
[ * P 2 3 ] [ * * * 1 7 ] Thus, in Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the
subcontractor's method of performing the work and instructed that a quicker but less safe
method be implemented. A worker was injured as a direct result of the dangerous condition
created by the general contractor's method. The court concluded, on the basis of these facts,
that the general contractor exercised sufficient control over the means used in performing
the contracted work to subject it to retained control liability. See 825 P.2d at 14-15.
[ * P 2 4 ] Applying these standards to the case at hand, we conclude that Jess did not
actively participate in the manner in which Thompson and Jensen attempted to lift and install
the steel pipe. After agreeing to erect the pipe, Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for
bringing about the desired result. Jensen decided to proceed with the equipment he had with
him, and by Jensen's own design, he and Thompson set up the A-frame for use as leverage,
fastened the chain to the pipe using the "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch" technique, and
hoisted the pipe with the winch on Jensen's truck. When this method was unsuccessful,
Jensen and Thompson attempted to lower the pipe to the [ * * * 1 8 ] ground and, in the
course of doing so, lost control of the pipe. Thompson's injury was caused by the manner of
performance, implemented by Jensen, over which Jess exercised no direction, control, or
supervision. The only control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be installed over the
pipe stub. This amounted merely to control over the desired result, which is insufficient to
come within the retained control doctrine.
[ * P 2 5 ] Particularly revealing is the fact that Jensen returned to the site with a backhoe the
day after the accident and erected the pipe without incident using the same chain-hitch
method. Nothing precluded Jensen from retrieving the backhoe before attempting to hoist
pipe in the first instance. The backhoe was stored only two to three miles away at the time,
and nothing suggests that Jess required Jensen to install the pipe at the moment of delivery.
Jensen alone chose to attempt installation of the pipe without a backhoe.
[ * P 2 6 ] Thus, because Jess did not actively participate in or otherwise exercise affirmative
control over the manner or method of performance utilized by Jensen and Thompson, she
owed Thompson no duty of care under the retained control doctrine. [ * * * 1 9 ] n3 The trial
court was correct in so ruling.

Footnotes
n3 We note that the term "retained control" doctrine is somewhat of a misnomer. Under the
standards announced herein, a duty of care is imposed if the principal employer asserts
affirmative control over or actually participates actively in the manner of performing the
contracted work. "Retained," to the extent the word implies passivity or nonaction, is inapt.
The term "retained control" may have a more syntactically correct application to
sophisticated parties who, by contract, stipulate which party will control the manner or
method of work or the safety measures to be taken—such as in contracts between general
contractors and subcontractors involved in construction projects. See Dayton, 148 P. at 411
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(noting that under terms of contract, principal employer did not reserve right to direct or
control prosecution of work or any of contractor's workers). The issue, however, of whether a
duty of care may be imposed solely as a result of a such a contractual reservation is not
before us.

-

End Footnotes

[***20]

B. "Peculiar Risk" or "Inherently Dangerous Work" Doctrine
[ * P 2 7 ] Thompson also relies on sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement and urges
this court to adopt those sections in his favor as exceptions to the general rule that one who
employs an independent contractor is not liable for injuries arising out of the contract work.
These sections are similar in wording and are commonly referred to as the "peculiar risk"
doctrine, see, e.g., Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 689, [ * * 3 2 9 ] 854 P.2d 7 2 1 , 725
(Cal. 1993) (en banc), or the "inherently dangerous work" exception, see, e.g., Wagner v.
Continental Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 421 N,W.2d 835, 840 (Wis. 1988).
[ * P 2 8 ] Section 413 is premised on direct liability for a principal employer's negligence in
failing to insure that special precautions are taken in the contractor's work. That section
provides:
§ 413. Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted
to Contractor
HN9Tf

One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize
as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to
others unless special [ * * * 2 1 ] precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such
precautions.
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 413 (1965),
[ * P 2 9 ] Sections 416 and 427 impose vicarious liability on the principal employer for the
contractor's negligence, even if the employer reasonably provides for precautions in the
contract work. Those sections state:
§ 416. Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize
as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of
the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the
employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.

§ 427. Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work
HNinp
One who employs [ * * * 2 2 ] an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger
to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the
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work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take
reasonable precautions against such danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416, 427 (1965). H / V i 2 ? T h e purpose of these sections is
"to ensure that innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an independent contractor
hired by a landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land would not have to depend
on the contractor's solvency in order to receive compensation for the injuries." Privette, 854
P.2d at 725, Privette held that this purpose is not advanced when these exceptions are
applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are covered by workers' compensation. See
id. at 726-30; see also Wagner, 421 N.W,2d at 840-44 (detailing reasons for not adopting
sections 413, 416, and 427 in favor of employees of independent contractors).
[ * P 3 0 ] We agree with Privette and Wagner and decline to apply section 413, 416,
[ * * * 2 3 ] or 427 of the Restatement in the manner Thompson proposes. Whether based on
direct negligence under section 413 or vicarious liability under sections 416 and 427, these
provisions have no application when the injured person is an employee of the independent
contractor undertaking the allegedly dangerous work. The majority of jurisdictions that have
examined this issue have decided likewise. n4
-

Footnotes

n4 See Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474, 481-82 (Alaska 1976); Welker v, Kennecott
Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App, 395, 403 P.2d 330, 337-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Jackson v. Petit
Jean Elec. Coop., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W,2d 66, 69 (Ark, 1980); Privette, 854 P,2d at 7263_U Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 548 A.2d 4 6 1 , 466 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Peone
v. Regulus Stud Mills, 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102, 105-06 (Idaho 1987); Johns v. New
York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382, 386-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Dillard v. Strecker, 255 Kan.
704, 877 P.2d 3 7 1 , 385 (Kan. 1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d
659, 661-63 (Ky. 1973); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md. App. 590, 547 A.2d 1080,
1082-83 (Md. Ct. Spec. App, 1988); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165, 466 N,E.2d
500, 502-03 (Mass. 1984); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 384, 390
(Mo. 1991) (en banc); Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557, 665 P,2d 270, 27374 (Nev, 1983); Donch v. Delta Inspection Services, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 567, 398 A,2d
.925, 927-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); New Mexico Electric Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89
N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634, 637-38 (N.M. 1976); Whitaker v. Norman, 75 N.Y.2d 779, 551
N.E.2d 579, 580, 552 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. 1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522
N.W.2d 445, 449-54 (N.D. 1994); Curless v, Lathrop Co., 65 Ohio App. 3d 377, 583 N.E.2d
1367, 1376-78 (Ohio Ct, App, 1989); Cooper v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,
Davidson County, 628 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Humphreys v. Texas Power
& Light Co., 427 S,W.2d 324, 330-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power
& Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 428-31 (Wash. 1981) (en banc); Wagner, 421
N.W.2d at 839-44; Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 1029, 1031-33 (Wyo. 1987).

-

End Footnotes

[***24]

[ * * 3 3 0 ] P31 Along with Privette and Wagner, Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties,
809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), is representative of those decisions. As expounded in
Zueck, if employees of an independent contractor are allowed to avail themselves of the
peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work exception, the principal employer is
placed in an untenable position: he or she must anticipate activities that are "inherently
dangerous" to the contractor's employees and, if the dangers inhere to the manner in which
the work is done, protect against such dangers despite the fact that the employees are best
able to identify and address whatever hazards are involved in their own method of
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performance. Oftentimes, both the risks involved and the protections necessary to avoid the
risks are beyond the principal employer's knowledge or capacity. Thus, to avoid the liability
imposed by the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work exception, the principal
employer has an incentive to direct his or her own employees to do the work despite their
lack of expertise. Such a choice would limit the principal employer's exposure to that under
the Workers' Compensation [ * * * 2 5 ] Act but, at the same time, increase the risk of injury
to the principal's employees and innocent third parties. Placing principal employers in such a
position distorts the objectives of tort law, and for that reason, the peculiar risk doctrine or
inherently dangerous work exception should not apply in favor of employees of the
independent contractor performing the work. See Zueck, 809 S.W,2d at 387-88.
[ * P 3 2 ] In addition, sections 413, 416, and 427 each speak of liability for injury "to others,"
which implies third parties rather than employees of the independent contractor carrying out
the contracted work. An early draft of the Restatement included a special note which, though
ultimately not adopted, provided guidance on this point:
Special Note. The rules stated in this Chapter are, in general, not applicable to make the
defendant who hires an independent contractor liable to two classes of persons.
One consists of the employees, or servants, of the defendant himself. . . .
The other class of plaintiffs not included in this Chapter consists of employees of the
independent contractor. . . . One reason why such responsibility has not developed has been
that the [ * * * 2 6 ] workman's recovery is now, with relatively few exceptions, regulated by
workmen's compensation acts. . . . While workmen's compensation acts do not infrequently
provide for third-party liability, it has not been regarded as necessary to impose such liability
upon one who hires the contractor, since it is expected that the cost of the workmen's
compensation insurance will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the work,
and so will in any case ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him.
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 7, Apr. 16, 1962) ch. 15, special note at 1718. The American Law Institute omitted this note due to lack of uniformity of the effect of the
various state workers' compensation acts but indicated nonetheless that "certainly the
prevailing point of view is that there is no liability on the part of the employer of the
independent contractor." 39 A . L I . Proc. 244, 247 (1962); see also Monk v. Virgin Islands
Water & Power Auth., 53 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 914, 116 S.
Ct. 302, 133 L. Ed. 2d 207 (19951 (referring to same language of tentative draft of
Restatement).
[ * P 3 3 ] The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is [ * * * 2 7 ] persuasive
and provides [ * * 3 3 1 ] additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of
the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the
work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encompass such employees,
but rather, innocent third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in Dayton and with
Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton to this issue. See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d
634, 636 (10th Cir. 1967) (concluding that phrase "to others" as contained in Restatement §
413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page,
350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S. Ct. 552, 15 L. Ed. 2d 470
(1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to
Restatement § 427).
[ * P 3 4 ] Holding otherwise would create unfair and anomalous results under Utah's workers'
compensation system:
Courts and legal commentators have expressed concern that to allow an independent
contractor's employees who incur work-related injuries compensable under the workers'
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compensation system to also seek damages under the doctrine of peculiar risk from the
person who [ * * * 2 8 ] hired the contractor would give those employees an unwarranted
windfall. As these authorities point out, to permit such recovery would give these employees
something that is denied to other workers: the right to recover tort damages for industrial
injuries caused by their employer's failure to provide a safe working environment. This, in
effect, would exempt a single class of employees, those who work for independent
contractors, from the statutorily mandated limits of workers' compensation.
Privette, 854 P.2d at 729. Furthermore, given that the exclusive remedy provision of the
workers' compensation scheme limits the liability of independent contractors to coverage
premiums, permitting an employee of the contractor to recover tort damages against the
nonnegligent landowner who employed the contractor would allow for the inequitable result
that a nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater than that of the person whose
negligence actually caused the injury. n5
Footnotes

n5 We note that in Utah, this unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that an employee who
recovers against a third party is obligated to reimburse the workers' compensation insurer for
any amounts paid to or on behalf of the employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)
(1997). Thus, if Thompson recovered from Jess for any negligence of Jensen in raising the
pipe, he would be required to reimburse AmeriKan Sanitation's insurer for benefits received.
Such a reallocation would result in Jess's being exclusively liable for Thompson's injuries.

End Footnotes

[***29]

[ * P 3 5 ] In the present case, there is no question that Thompson was an employee of the
independent contractor, AmeriKan Sanitation, at the time of his injury. He was involved in
attempting to install the pipe and, indeed, has been receiving workers' compensation benefits
through AmeriKan Sanitation since the accident. We have no reason to question the
determination (already made as a prerequisite to Thompson's qualifying for such benefits)
that Thompson was acting within the course of his employment when injured. See Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986) (noting that to qualify for workers'
compensation benefits, injury must be "by accident" and must arise "in the course of
employment"). Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that
Thompson's sole recourse is workers' compensation benefits.
CONCLUSION
[ * P 3 6 ] In view of the foregoing analysis, summary judgment in favor of Jess was proper.
Affirmed.
[ * P 3 8 ] Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice
Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's opinion.
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